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8X X 0 P S I S 
2h« alB of thifl dl«s«rt«tiOB i« to «««lii« th« 
eoatritottUoii of tho Froaoh &(i«t«tiU«llflt PM.loso|»litr Joftn* 
Fata iJavtr* to tJEio A«atbotiea d«liB«atiiiK tho ttvuotur* 
runda&Mital to tlM dcmaln of imagiiAtlOB* 
Xbo KTOft of r«aMroh uadortalCMi iuks boon spooiflod 
la tho latfvdilotlon of tbo work • Its aim la to firaat tli« 
problaa anA to danaroato tloa l int of dlaauaalon on tba 
flttbjaot* 
Cliiq>tar I la datrotad to a baokfronad dlaeuaaloa of 
Ijiaf li» tloa la t)ia lictit of ftuodaaantal laaighta a^la^ad 
la Waatam fttHetoj/bj ovar two tloeuaaad yaara of thaoritlaf 
about laaglaatloB* A wlda varlaty of vrltara frea Plato to 
Wlttgaaatala aad aeaa laadlag lltaraturaa ara fvf briaflsr 
^ i^aouaaad* A eoapaa tlTa atudy of tJnaaa pbllosophara aad 
ttia aoToBanta tiiar rapraa«it lodloataa tha oontradloteiy aad 
Taiifgrlai dtf ialtloaa aad fuaetloaa of SaagiaatioB* Attantloa 
laaa ttaarafora baaa davotad to aigailgat ttia diffaxaaeaa aa 
vail aa tl|#^ alallarltiaa batwaaa tbaaa tvaada of tJaougiit or 
their rcprttsaatatlTM. fills tea aftturall/ l«d ui tovaxdt 
« dlsout8lo& Oft ^rtr«' s analyslt of the eonotpt of 
ImaglnAtioa* 
Hoir«T«r« before i^ooeedlag in that direotleat i t 
vae fe l t neoessary to glTe e brief expoeition of Sertre** 
Ontology* i t foras the chapter III of this work* I t elfo 
ineluues a syatenatie study of the eKistentlal psycho* 
eQalyais of dartre and his c ritlciam of Freadiea psycho-
analysis* Xhis obapter provides basis for tae study of 
Sartre's taeory of iaaginatloQi which naturally aad logic-
al ly scerges froa his ontological and psychological 
eoncepts* In his analysis of cxistencey iftrtre has dealt 
with various aodes of being and tneir relation to conscious-
ness iChd freedoa. ^nee* his definition and McpTxtsition of 
iaagimtion could not be explaiaed without having an 
-8dei;uate knowledge of his ontological position* 
This ontological as well a t psycho-analytical 
discussion has paved our way for aa eKpositioa of £>artre* s 
Xheory of laagination which forms the chapter lH <tf this 
work* Sartre has discussed the Phenaaeaological a« well as 
the Fsycholgical aspects of Imagination^ but since the aain 
eonoern of this work i s to derive his thesis txtm his onto-
logical standpoint, the psycholigical aspect (w£dch i s purely 
experiasntal) has tnerefore been ouKitted* Ihe phenonenolo-
gieal aspect has necesslatated ug to delve into tne deves t 
details of consciousness without ignoring ;9artre' s Predecessors 
vis* ikne, Kant or Freud etc* 
Cb«pt«r IV has flsftlly be«B duvoUd to tbm arltieal 
estlmatloii of dlftaait Undaiwiai of tliooflit ao far 
dlseuasod* Attaatlon hat baan IkovaYar aalaly foaasaA for 
astablisliinc i^  aonelusion through a eritiaal analyala of 
tha ooooapt of inag inatlon la Sartra and othar thlakara* 
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I I I J O D U ^ I i f i ^ - . 
« * • 
I H T B C P T l G t I O S 
IflAgln&tlon l8 ono of tbt estential eleiaents in art 
and artifltie ermtiim* It hftt b««n deCin«d| lutrepevted 
and anal^sad in different va^s* It would be better to 
•tart with '^mt i t liBagination"? ^ t a r w d a different 
d^finitiona and inteipretatlona of iaaginatlon may be 
analysed to arrive at seaa coneltision* But btfore pvooeed-
ing In that direction two pointa neB& to be clarified. 
Firatly, the nature and proeeaa of lisaglnatlon Isf 
to aoa» extent, general andf therefore, ambigloua* This 
la aialnly beoauae It la applicable to and ^aplof^d in al* 
aioat a l l the f ields of Int^Ueetaallaatlon* Ita Interpret 
tera, aoeordlnglf Include not only the pasrohologlats. 
eplfltoaologlata and the erlt lea of art and literature but 
ev«3 a layaan oplnea about i t . 
Secondly, in the hlatorieal retrospect, this problems 
haa be«i of central laqjortance In the fields of both phllo-
2 
•opIiQr aod llt«ratU7e» But th« Iijri« of desiarcatloa betv««B 
phl lofo i^ and literature haa not baan aueh cleajr* Th^ are 
ae eloaelj ralata^ that aoaw of the phllosopiiera have even 
ifitered In the f ield of literature as they find i t a flK>r« 
purposeful iwdiufli of expraaalng their view point, Henoe in 
our treatacnt of the problea, ve wi l l Inalude @pl8toaologis> 
tfy psyehologltts and the er i t le* of art and l i twature but 
the l ine of deoiaraatioB between phileaopby and literatisie 
wil l reraaln blurred* 
A« a general concept| iiaaglnatloQ la regarded to be 
that power of creating oental inaget which i s not a direct 
derivative of either a^fiaation oT onderf tanding* I t i t 
rather held to be an eutooaa of aose coanon relationship 
between sensation and understanding* Imglnatlon i s dis* 
cussed in relation to kno%aedge and held to be either true 
or fa lse . But generally i t i s regarded to refer to soioe 
unreal thing which has i t s referent in the objective 
reality* 'loagining' i s generally equated with 'supposing! 
V^hile supposing issy refar to a noft^^dstent thing, hence 
false knowledge, but *isMLginlng* i s not neemiamftliy fa lse . 
Bven in eoaawii usage the statanants "Suppose such and sueh 
and * Imagine such and soah' are held to stand for one and 
the aaao unreal thing, henee both ecmsidered to stand 
for unreality. 
&it philosophers, particularly 6pistoaologists,have 
eff«r«d th«if fimm oa thlf j»robl«B in vayiont eo8t«xlff* 
Vhil« lOM have f9gard«d i t M an «tf«fsll«l •I«atiit of 
k!io«l«dg«, worn h««« r«gwrd«d It M an elMit«eX« to I t and 
ioai otb«r» emiild»r I t to be both am « «oiiftltit^3t of «• 
well as an obatacla to knoiKladga. 
ftio lntell«ettta2. miaSi of pra»aoeratle period ima so 
ongfossed with isetaplijrsioal problow that tha saoaltlfa 
Issastt Ilka iiasglnatlont eould not attfaat aor attsntiom 
eiisilftFlTy Soorat99 vas so pert^oaeapiad idth athiaal a&d 
eoneeptoal probl«aa that ha too eouXd aot pa^ r angr attastloa 
to this problaa, AXthoitgh l^lato took this Issaa sarlwisly 
bat in tha tettinf of his thooght ioafioatioB beeonas a 
scJiawhat lovar aental aet l f i tyi ineapabla of ffiviitg toraa 
ksa!vlc!(!g#» In Aristotla, **inRgiii8tioti i s iapossibla anless 
1 
the actual sansfttioB cmkes a {Rofanaat"* Hara also laagl* 
nation c*o«ff not find anjr leading role in knovledga baeausa 
in tha settinf of hit thoiight» **thifikins i s in pavt iaagina-
2 
tion and in part jadgananl** • 
Daseartek dualisn treated iaagination as a bodily 
fonetion. "In so far as va have pwa ideas thaf belong to 
sAvO. i«e^ « to pare thinking bat as inages, thar are rmprm-^ 
ff«»nt«d with the h«lp of body." Vfhether It vas Dasaartes 
pttrely Intelleetnal hc»i«sty or his intense desire to save 
phi losoi^ all-roond froa any possible Christitfi inflaenaa, 
that led hia to asariba iOMglnatioii soah a low plaaa, v i U 
4 
b* difoaated la th» ant tkttpUx, Bat Berkeley altOf vtio 
waa mlBlf iRt«?6ffted In yalioaaXiBiiie Chrlttianitisr, eouXd 
iwt provide any leading role to InftglnatoB, altboagh be 
granted that 'lisaglnatloa dotii danot* tha slnd aetiva'. 
Roiiav«7 for tba f i r s t tine in th« hlatory of phllosoptQr 
RtaM aaorlbad to luaglnatlen the eentral rola In hlf theory 
of knovladga, Inttaad of teeing vhath<ir liaaglnation gives 
true or falsa knovlaga, Ruaa assigned to It the important 
rola Qi coflMnlng the slaple or eoapiaz laprasalons, vhleh 
va reeeive froa the axtamal vorld, thereby giving rlseto 
an Idea, Sliq>le or eooplax laprassloas provide the aaterial 
oa vhloh loaglnatlon plays freely so as to forn a nev Idee. 
In this aens«> the function of loaglnation beeoiaes highly 
lflq»ortant and fnndafflentally ereative. It i s an entirely 
free aativity. But Kan6 takes ap this problem soaieiihat 
differently. His a-prlorlstlo philosophy vot4ts as a bridge 
betveen lntelle«tualis« e | rationalists and the Sensational* 
i s jr ^ r l e l s t f t . For Kant whatetar Is given to us Is 
phenomenon vhleh when oonneeted with eonselousness Is eaUed 
perception* Sinee different pereeptlons are found in the 
mind slngsly and seattef«d» a eonneetlon between them 
Is necessary* TherexlstSi theraforei In us an aetive pover 
for the synthesis of the oanifold* Kant cal ls this power 
for the synthesis of the manifold as Imagination* 
Col«rldge made a distinction between primary and 
secondary imagination. Primary imagination Is the main-
M 4iMiifl««a la th* ii*x% «lMi|^ t«r« Bat Bi^«l«f alaot '^'^  
mil mlBly iiit«y»tt«d la talloatllslag Chrlttlaidlisrf eoal4 
aet provide caf iMdlag vol* to laafliMiltoBt altboagh h« 
gftuit«4 that 'laaflmtloa 4otli i«a»t« tli« aiai aatlv** • 
]ioiiaf«r foY tiM fIjrat tlM la tb« tdftorf of ptiUosopbj 
IbUM aMrlbt4 to la»cla«tioa tli« o«atJpal ToXt la hit th«err 
of kaowlodc** Zattood of •oarlaf nhothey laagliiatloB glv«i 
tra« or falso kaoid.«g«« Siiao Milsao4 to It tho iJi^ortiiat 
solo of ooidilalBg ttio tlapl* ov ooi^oi laprottlOBtf vhUh 
y r«8elve froa tlio oxtofaal vorl4» tliorelgr slviag rltoto 
ca 14«a, Slapio or eooplox laproffloiM provldo tHo attorlal 
oa iHiloh laaglnatloa playt f^ooly to «• to fora a B«V Idoo* 
la this t«nf« th« fanetioa of laaflaatloa boeoisAs highly 
laportaal and fttadaMntally oroatlfo* It la aa eatlrOlj 
free aotlvitr* Bat Kaafc takea ay thla prohlca aoaonliat 
dlffev«ntl9r, l i t a*prlerlatl« phllesophgr %ioik« at a teldge 
hetvoea latelleataallca af tatloBaXltta aod tho S«aaatloaal* 
la of Baprlelatft. For Kaat nhatatar If glvaa to a« l i 
ph«floa«BeA vhlah vhaa ooaoaeted mth acaaeloaan^a la oalXed 
peraeptloa* Slaaa dlffareat p«F«optlona are foaad la tha 
•lad alagaXf aad taattatady a aoaaeotloa betwim thea 
la aeoaaaafy, tharaxltttf th«rafor«| la at aa aatlta pamr 
for tha ajratbealt of tha oaalfold* Xaat aalXa thla povar 
for tha ayathasla of tha ouilfold aa laaglaatloa. 
Colarldge aada a dlatlnatloa hatvaan prlaaty aad 
aaaoodarr laaglnatloB, Prlaarr laaglaatloa la tha aala-
•pnng of kBoid«df« hmmtM* !%• mU faMtioB i i tiM 
iKire«ptl<m of %li« votli* XB orAMr to ermf mm iA«at, 
RoMit «• laiA abovtt ndLfiM ftiipl* or eoi^lox id«M« 
Bat in Ool«ridg«, Stoondiyy iaagiaaitioa di«tovM« dlffat««, 
dittipotofl ao M to ovMto o nov lAoo* thiatflf •eooHint 
fee Ool«rld(«| mr% in thMif«lv«t flxod oaA dooA • SoeeadAry 
iBftgiiMiUoii voilt«| aafe onSy • • o wniiyiAg og«nt tafe alfo 
gif•« l ir« fee febe fUM AHA 44MI4 fehiiigt. MeWMworfeh tie« 
•OMfeliafe dlf f oroisfe oylaloa o& feM pvoMLMi of i«agliiftfeioo 
b99miB9 ho hod taidoiifealsr figrood vXth Kant thuti aesttiefelo 
id«o eould tt«vav b«» aspifsflSQd in vords* Hence loiigliiftfeloii 
la IJordovof feh olAfi fecwoi^ii thot vMoh Ife coul^ nm^i vtiolljr 
grofp. Uowdf«jr fciT v^ 'ordsvortUy pKrcsptiiml eXa.?it^ ! • 
iapoiioiia.0 itiaotf feM yoofe ofefealBi fuXl uMeTitimdiiig boood 
on laoglnotloii. II follow« ti)«r. tt^t Vtibrdi^ ^rth plMieo 
ItfogimUon abovd uii49ratAndix)g« That is vhj h^ '^a/f ttiafe 
*g««*fe«ir iti« luagliiaiXda gi^^ater the midert1;as^in£ &2id 
I«co«t]? Uio oobigoifeT^ &£ jHitjfoepfeioA.* If «o cocid aeayot fee 
felio piroottfife ««atu£y| a^ O* ttlsUJLiag^raod t«aif us t;hai feho 
a t t i s t a^akdf use ot «A iisiaglrifitAye Gxparlan^^ t^ ^ v-^ xproit 
ttttotloOA* aasaa longar psints oat th&t ii!^ Lglr:if.tl9e oiforl* 
«M« in tx»X99Siii through firt^e^oA^oli, 
li« discus»Ioa eafliy l^ e aeld to b« cczr^efce If It doof 
not l^|«r t€ th9 Llagul2tlc tumlysis at the yrsbXt^ oodo fef 
Luuhilg V i t logonsteln* lift i^«s not Appr&acb the ;pivblOM of 
i«ogli)&Uofi div«ot2jr« aovc9«r, for hl& iii&^ln£.tion la o 
6 
M«at or forslof i « i « f la UM sliiA* fli# iMgw |ii«af«lfM 
f not •^ p«f«%« ffOB mat itt%«r^«to«leac or tin verlaftiMjr 
w wot M^ of tlUflklag of %li« olij«ott la tlio vovXd* 
swtr»« hftt funlslioA on •M«li«iit mBtms^ oT ttat 
pli«iio«bDXo8l«»l fiov of iMiiiMtloa. Ho hot ^mm—A tiM 
•iniitoft AotolXt of tbo pbtnoMOOlofiool oaoXfoU of tho 
laaginBitlfo eo]b«ioomioof« In hit viow isifiMitiOB doot not 
f i l l op th» fopof in oot f•!!•• ovpivioiie* ao proponadotf fef 
RIUM« UHllko HoMf Swtro otiovi thot iMclnotioii oad oonot-
t iM oifo poloa oport boooaoo •oatoUos lo tHo osporiomo of 
tho y««l ¥lilX« iMflBBtion If itf tbo oarool* 
IB tuo Ufbt of tiMio ditorgont nmm m^^x^Um 
UH^liMtioa wo ooB lof ina^olr r«io« tiw qmatXom mmh 
Ofll 
Vbot i t aoool lir iMOfliiotloa? 
How ha 3 thta «3w>!5stlon Mem tr«sat?»3 hiii*orl<»«Hjr? 
Hev for IS" tttlt orol»l«i lolovoot to tiM Mm vlio 
tc at th« throjtihottf of f l t t crnttsry? 
ThiJ vo?!: vdll broF-11'7 dls-ast th€»<» i?^ ctNsf 
qu'^stHrs that; •':J57 arlsn lRt«r, CoajarlffORt» rtnJUrltlot 
and dlfr«r«Jnoe-fi, vl?.3 alsc be tett«B lute ttefTORt tvi.thlil 
the fxftii'r'.nre ??* <:f tbt? pr«s«r7t rtTz<5T, '-^ ^ ??«?• for *!>xai^lM 
ccapar- Cole-ri^ S^^a v5<n» on Ir^^glnstlon tfltli th*»t cf 
A^itjr€f»-fcrth but st'.xdy Hnnii sivS Kant t^ ^prrat^ lx *-'tt.h sr with-
out iit)!y «c.Mpfer1&on ftf thf cmsQ nsj b». '^ 'ie -VJITI, «% th« 
t'-od, foct'S iur attention on Csrtrc, J^rtre*« •!«» ^ 1 1 , 
9feilotei>li«Ff y«ir«tyti 1» ^ M e««ir«« of diveastleBt f ^ tli« 
B 
& k, L k A k ii k ii, A 
!• Ajpl«fcoUe» H ^ m (Qtt tSftf gflttl) trai«i. Richajrd m^omi 
nmioBk Hott8«» (H«v York, 194X) Boc& XIX, 4^ B ^ a - 4ZB 
S» lllM*» 4R7 S8b, p. 587. 





0 B E E K 
PBRIOD 
Pr«-Socr«tlc thinkers v«re| no doubt, eonceyn^d vlth 
alaost a l l the problems' of l i f e and universe but th«ir 
approach was not systoiaatio, Sjrstenetio philosophy begins 
with Socrates only. Biit in vim* of thi? rwature of our 
problem, Socrates may also have to be deleted because he 
vas prejudicial tovards art due to hie ethical considera-
tions. It i s generally established that Soeratea vas essen-
1 
t ia l ly a laorallst but some scholars, for exas^>le, John j^irnet* 
xaaintain that soat of the vorks of Plato, vis Pheado, Sy09)O-
siun and even Fepublio aetually represent the vievs of 
Soeratesf Plato vas sis^ly a stouth*pieee of Socrates* How-
ever, ve i!»ty drop ^>orates and see tow his disciple Plato 
deals vlth this problfa because his views are at least based 
upon the teachings of Soerates, 
I . Plato vas the f irs t systetaatle rationalist. Being 
essentially a aietaphyslclan, he has givon leas attention 
tovards the probieai of iHBginatlon vhich i s psychological 
in nature, Hovever, his views on this probicja ca/i bo traced 
from his theory of knovledge. But i t must be poiiited 
out that the concept of Imagination, «• ve know i t i;oday, 
d«f•loped v«ry l*t« In phtlopoi'hf» Hence w« oajr not perhaps 
b« able to pin-point th3 vlsva of Pla to on t h i s problem as 
c l ea r ly as h is views on iaetaphysical problems coul<^ be, 
E . s ; Peters has r i g h t l y pointed ou t : 
" being concerned more v l th the cognit ive 
value of loental process than the i r I n t r i n s i c 
character is t iCy Plato pays l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to 
t h i s power of producing unreal appeararaes" . ? 
The problem of knowledge i s d e a l t with by Plato in 
"The Theaetetus" ( in d e t a i l ) and in »mepublic" ( to a lesser 
ex t en t ) . 
I hether "Perception i s knowledge" or not i s the main 
problem of "The Theaetetus" a«l to deny th i s assumption»tt \\. 
is, not to equate perception (or sense-percepta as "Fransis 
4 e 
Cornford" put i t or Sensation as "John Burnet" put i t ) v i J i 
knowledge i s one of the aala aims of "The Theaetetus", -nftcr 
a l o t of argument, the t h e s i s tha t "knowledge i s perception 
i s refuted by Plato on the basis of Herac l i t i an pos i t ion tha t 
" a l l th ings are In a f l u x " . In h i s view Sense-perception, 
which change with changing phenomena, cannot provide secure 
ground for knowledge. The sense organs of perception, as the 
argument goes, are ac tua l ly the ins t runents through which we 
perceive char.-gr'. Thought, vhlch ia purely o i7if»nt«l e c t l v l t y , 
Is thp only faculty ia sisn in vhlch a l l theje s snsa t i cas 
ccnvorge, v.hra thought ccaes to a conclusion, i t i s cal lec 
Judf;':-!>'tnt; us the arguoient gees5 
" , vhen the rtlnd I s thlnklnc:, i t Is r^iffiply 
ta lking to I t s e l f 1 a faking quet t lons and ansverlng 
the r -^hen I t r^'sc'^fs • decision - vher 
doubt i» 0¥«r c.nd th r tvc v/olces afflria th© same 
th lnp , then v« c a l l t ha t I t s •Judgement'". 6 
Nov t h a t l8 t h i s ju:d^f»f?«nt that tskes r l a c in n.lnd 
Should w€ c e l l t h i s something which Is happ<?nlni? ir. mind &s 
icjaglnatlon? Ifift us keep t h i s quet t lon pending and see vhat 
I s Fl&tc spgulng In his "Republic" on lae t i inat lon. But 
tsfopi t'^ f^lt i t I s c^lsc necessary to ountlon here tnat sfte: 
dl sc'.-'£ sing the t rue and f a l ae Judgement, Plato concludes 
"The Theaetetus** on the thes i s tha t "Knowledge can nei ther 
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bo sensation nor the vcrk of mlna". 
In "FfDufcllc" Plato divides the whole do^isln cf 
kncvle-df* Into tvo p a r t s , v l ^ , the 'dcv-sin cf v i s i b l e norlci" 
end tb? 'dcmnln of lntPll igiW.€ world*. He divides tieir. 
fur ther Into tvc sect ions <»ach. 
A. '*One of the tvo sec t ions In the v i s i b l e world 
weald stand for liaages , , . . » i . e , f i r s t sihedcws". 
? . "The sfcond sect ion stands for the aetwsl thing? 
of whoa the f i r s t aro the llkGnesses" •' 
o. "In the f i r s t " , of I n t e l l i g i b l e ^or ld , "the 
Jdnd usee a« larages those ac tua l things which 
thecaeelves had images in the v i s i b l e world". 
h, "In the second the aiind moves • . . from an 
agsutt^ition up towards a p r inc ip le which i s 
not hypothetical and i t iaakesino use of ioages 
rmploypd In the other fec t l cn , but only of 
Ferns . . . , . . • * 8 
Plato cal ls ttieie four stAges &a Intelligence, 
l^lnklng, Belief and Xoaglning* But they are not merely 
e^loyed In this orderi because Plato says: 
"You my arrange as th« tsrms In a proposition 
assigning to each a degree of clearness and 
certainity eorrosponding to the sMMtsure in 
%mich their objeovs possess truth and real i^".^ 
On a closer exaninatlon of these tvo views of Plato 
as expressed in "The Theaetetus" and <*Bepublie" ve oay coae 
to the conclusion that the thought vhieh he expresses in 
"Hepubllc" signifying •iaiagination* and •belief» i s not th»? 
saiae thought or judgeaent or 'the completed process of 
thought : • "The Theaetettts*, ^ rightly 
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poftAted out by Burnet the * thought* vhich Plato expressed 
in "Republic" i s soaething lower than the 'thought' which 
he moans in "The Theaetetus". So i t becomes clear ttiat for 
Plato» ioagin&tion was a lower m^ n^tal &Gtlvity wht^ reas that 
lasntal activity which gives knowledge i s higher oae« This 
iSf however I laainly because Plato was interested in the 
cognitive value and not the intrinsic character of things. 
It can also be oaintained that since Plato was mainly interest-
ed In metaphysical, political and ethical problems, he could 
not attach such importance to the intrinsic value of aental 
activity. His failure to recognise the value of arts and 
artists emerges from his lack of interest In the mental 
processes other than (pure) thought. 
I I , Tmas:!nation for Platc« a» «ntiiB9rat:^d above, rcaainec 
a kind of lover ff^nttl a c t i v i t y . The d i s t i nc t i on b'^tv'^en 
l-7a?lnatlcn and opinion I s not so c lear In Plato as we fln^: 
I t in A r i s t o t l e , The theory of imagination of ^ r i s t v t l e i s 
highly sTSte.Tjatic sad aiore ac l en t l f l o thsn tha t of P la to . 
He discusses t h i s theory In his work " l e Arjlnia" (en the soui) . 
The bsslc category of exlstenwe, accorciln?^ to 
- - r i s t c t l e , le s e l l « To and«trttand I t s natureiand i t s 
essen t ia l proper t ies i s the' slm which he s e t s for hliaseif 
In "If? -HHinia". In I t s f i r s t be ok he r e j e c t s the opinions 
ot early thinkers about soul by exposing t h e i r d l f f l - u U l e s 
p.nd Incmffiptfncl ^f. In I t s second book he prasrnts en out-
l i n e of the nature cf soul "tf refer ing I t j 
' 8 ) In the sp^nse of nmtter" — I t I s p o t e n t i a l i t y . 
"b) in the sense of fora" — i t i s a c t u a l i t y . 
••c) In the sense of tha t whleh i s conpQUfid of both 
(a) and (b)» 11 •— in t h i s matter Is poten-
t i a l i t y p.nd form Is energy? mtt^^r thus exjs ts 
only ifflplicit ly. 
"Hence the soul**, ameordiAg to i»Yiatotle, "must be 
a substance in the sense of the fo ra of a na tura l body 
having l i f e po ten t i a l ly within i t . Bat substance (in the 
sen8<? of foris) i s ac tua l i ty^ and thus soul i s th«> ac tua l i ty 
IP 
cf a boay , , , , ' * vjorresponding to plant l i i « , aiiiriaii i i i c 
and hua&n l l f o , soul i s to b« determined in tm-ee Wc^ ys? 
nemely as n u t r i e n t , as sensltlVf and as Intf ilig^o-nt, V.hen 
I t I s only nu t r ien t i t belongs to the category cf p lan t s , If 
i t isjboth nu t r ien t and sens i t i ve ( i , e , v^en I t possesses 
1 ». 
•enf«*p«r«eptioa a l i o ) i t i f %Ym animsl sool, and vhen I t 
i f nutr i fnt , fonfit lfa and in te l l igent sioultaneously i t 
if the sdiid of aan. Bat thf parobles if bov to re la ta these 
threa fo af to form a fingXe dafialt ion of soul* Ansto t la 
holdf that ve naod not look for ona aoul in vtiich a l l tha 
threa are fotud baeaofa that i f not possibla. Soal haf 
diffarent levc^ls ranging from tha siapleft manifestation in 
plantfl to tha most coaplax form i . e . iaan*8 mind* Ha cl&rifi-
ss hif iioffition ty giving ths ^aample os' ^eccietrice.! figure. 
A ecmpl«2 g^ciTietrleal figure c&n bfi nrrang^j*'. in vn iirdw 
bt^ 2lnn5.nn vith a sinplP tr iangle arid Rsau^^ e isjorr'? co^jplex 
fcnns *Keh of r-=hich contains? pc-tonti«ily a l l thc.t proceeda 
from I t . Sijtllarly the forcis of aool consti tute a aeries 
In sueh tin orcar that paeh fcln<i of ^f'Ul pr**»apponss a l l that 
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eome!«i bpfcr*'^  i t in th is cs'c©r. The Icvest or tt'C f i r s t 
scttl i3 nutritifr. « ft r i t e s i s t s in a l l t^csculeO b- ings 
elikfi <plit tf incliuUKi), Cermltive scul ^Tit*tt in cnimals 
only* Toueh, t a s t e , saelly heaving and sl^ht ar^ tha foras 
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of anljaal foul vhieh have their win hirrferchal order. Bat 
perceiving Is not tha only fur«tlon of sensi t ive amU* I t 
h&« two &spactf| ths appetetive vhcs*^ cut«^rovth if i^staorf^ 
and the oognitiva i^ose offfNwt i f Inaiglneticn, 
Henea sena©•pareeption t»rainat«9 «t imeginatton 
which if a fort of I t s bjr-produet. Aristot le diacussef i t 
In the liook I I I of Do-Anliaa. He does not consd<Ior p^cf i f -
ing to b5 idontleat %iith thinking BS held by thi? thinkerf 
bafor« hliB, He holds that p«reelvlng la universcil in the 
animal world %Ai«reftt thinking Is found only in a s^sall 
division of i t . Imagination belongs neither to thirling 
nor to pereeiving, **though i t Is not found without aenau-
tlon or judgement without it"« But that does not follow 
that imagination and judgeBx»nt areisaote. Because "imagining 
l ie$ within our power wherever we wish (e.g. we can eal l 
up a picture, as In the practice of laejnories bjr the use of 
ntental iiaages). \mt in foradng opinions we are not free : 
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we oani»t escape the alternative of falsehood or truth". 
Judgiaent, for Aristotle, provokes enotlons of rejection 
or approval whereas that la not iwsslble la imagination. 
Thinking and perceiving are quite two different things but 
thinking and judgment are not un-related; the later (judge-
ment) in fact arises from the totsmx (thinking). That i s 
why Aristotle holds that thinking la "in part imagination 
17 
and in part judgment"* 
The faculties by virtue of which images arise are 
sense, Intil l igence, science and opinion. Whether iiBaglna-
tion i s any one of thea or a coapound of a l l or few of them 
i s a problea with which Aristotle deals in detail . 
1. S F N 8 Ki liaaginat&oii i s not 'sense* due to thi^  
followli:^ considerationst-
"(1) Sense Is either a faculty or an activity, e.g. 
sight or seeingi 
(5) Sense 1» alvays present, Imeginetlon net: 
f3) Sensatlont are alvaye trucj ineglnetions ere 
for the most part falae; 
le 
(4) Vldcnf Gppear to ut wh«n our ^€s ar«* shut". 
(6) Serwe refers to real object, Ifljaglnation c!ce» 
not refer to concrete reality. 
^I. ^^i^CK MP m '^-MJOr-f^ fft' "Neithar i s loaglna-
tion ai^ of th« things that ara naver in arror e.g. knov-
19 
ledge or Intelllgeneaf for inaglnation iaay be falsa*', 
III , OPINION t 1^ the discourse of reason convic-
tions fivclve; aenviatlons becona the basis of belief. 
Cplnlons necessarily Involve belief, for vlthout belief 
one cannot form an opinion. Bat ttJers ere people, Aristotle 
holdg, vho possess imagination but vlthout belief (l.e« with-
out reason) .g , uncivilized people or brut*"S, 
It Is than clear that Aristotle regarda iiaaglnation 
to ba neither any one of thCte states nor a eoapnund of them. 
Imagination, according to ttla, i i a i»3v<'«fiiant producad by 
actual s'^nsation and unlest the actual sensation makas a 
acvament, iasaglnation i s impossible. Since raov*aont i s 
naeattarlly similar In charaetar to sanaation) 'movement must 
neeessarlly be ineapabl«* of existing apart from sensation 
and camot exist unless ve pareeiva, Vthathar this movaoint 
i t i^etiva or passive dapenda largely on the natur? of percep-
tion particularly vhen the object la far off. Similarly, 
ifh«th«r this ooveatot It tm* or fali« d«pondi on percep> 
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tloa b«eftU8« •ena«»illttiioiif ar« ftlvcyt po«sibl«« 1% it 
in vi«v of thla baskground that Arlstotl* holda "iotgln&tion 
ottft b« a ODvaaant raaaltiiig froa an aotoal ex«rclse of a 
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povar of aenaa". 
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III Aft417 Qx9ek» th« endMfours in pursuit of 
knowledge) though under the Influence of Aristotle, were 
completely doalnated by Christianity. This period Is 
generally known as the dark age m the pursuit of truth 
and knowledge. Philosophy remained just a hand«aalden of 
Chrlstlandoa t i l l 15th century A.D, until the dogsiatle 
apiaroaoh towards the subjeot was ehallanged during the 
Renlansanee period. All the old traditions of belief end 
dogaa, so far held in este^t, were finally shattered and 
thrown off with the dawn of H>dern period i . e . the beginning 
of 16th e^tury A«P, 
Two oain tendencies v is , nationalism and Emp;rlel8i& 
evolved during the modern period* Eatlonalist thought Is 
represented by the philosophers like DesearteSf Splnosa and 
Lelbnit.. lAiereas Lock, Berkley and Hume represent the 
eaprlcal thought. However, the two divergent streams got 
converged In the a-priori of philosophy of Kant, The probleci 
<-- _ i . 
of Ifl&giiifttioiif «i dMlt vlth bjr the oaln thinkers of thene 
schools of thought v l l l be discussed her^ briefly. 
I . Intelleetual honesty and the aiethodie doubt aade 
Descartes the father of modern philosophy* He did not ques-
tion the possibility of knovledge tait raised the question 
regarding certitude of knovledge. In this endeavour he 
etoploys his faaous methodic doubt or universal doubt - the 
principle that we sust doubt everything before starting our 
Inquiry. 
"That in order to seek truth, i t is necessary once 
in the course of our l i f e to doubt, as far as 
possible, of a l l things", 1 
Deaeartes could doubt everything except the very act 
of 'doubting itself*. Doubting, for hlfii, means thinking 
vhich is the function of mind. 
The * Cardio* Vascular * feature of the philosopt^ of 
Descartes i s bis definition of mind, lUnd, he holds, i s 
essentially a thinking thing vhich has no connection vith 
the corporeal vorld. Imagination, in th« setting of his 
thought, remains function of brain because i t i s related 
and connected vith the corporeal vorld« He says: 
"I have often shovn, that the mind can vork 
independently of the brain; for clearly there 
can be no use of th« brain for pure intelligence, 
but only for imagination and sens&tion'*, 2 
This i s a clear statement that pure intellig«'nce 
belongs to mind vhereas imagination belongs to brain vhich 
la a soflwvhat low«r meatal activity• The ideas apon vhleh 
iBliid operatas doas not depend« althar for thtir origin or 
for their truth, upon the vorld of objects. IRiase are the 
so-called Innate ideas vhlch have an indefinite potentiality 
of thought. Innate Idees* for Descartes« are purely the 
facts of consciousness vhldi have nothing to do with the 
physical vorld of objects. That i s vby he finds such notions 
as those of God, axiosis of mathematics, the ideas of figures 
such as circle , the idea of t ioe, spiioe, motion, i tc . te be 
thQ innute ICuja-;?, Vh^raati a l l Saoao notions 'rf?i5.:^ h have thair 
objecs in t;i«? plijrslcal \<inrld b^lon? to brain, u^aonn other 
innctions losMglrintlon i s on$ of Che esstntlRl "rwctlon of 
brain. 
leacartes ciasflifles iciets as (e) Tnnet*^  fb) Adventi-
tious i.e* dependent on external conditions: end 'c) r£:de by 
the fldnd (factitious, coaplait idaar ct isie^lnaiy c b j ^ t s ) . 
In CO far as th«6y ar« pure idcssp they b"loafj to t^ -r^JiA 
i . e . to pure thinking but as l2sans^ 3 thrr/ are r^ pr»»s#»nted 
with the help of body. So the part played by body i s tbt 
dlsticfulthing factor fcetvesn idea and en li^ aga t^icanae the 
cieln characteristic Qt liiige i s to b^  oorpcrMl„ 
In his end«Mivour of corapleta #>Buiniclpatlon of a l l th< 
fli<»ntfil processes frcffl th€ whole physic*! prccesses^tescartes 
tfoo5 net only natntfein that brcln i s needed for Ime^lnatlon, 
but ftlffc that "Rc ccrpor?*! species i s received in the aind; 
pur« thinking i s p«rfora»d vlthout any corporeal species; 
ifflfigination, hoveter, vhieh ean only arise in the case of 
corporeal things, needs species , which i s a truly corporeal 
3 '^ 
thing". He further c l a r i f i e s i t In l^e^itation VI where 
he distinguishes between loagination and pure in te l l ec t ion . 
He says that whereas we can imagine a triangle as a figure 
coiapound of only three s ides , w« eanaot iinagine the thousand 
sides of a ehil iagon, as we do the three sides of a trianglef 
though due to oar habit we oay represent confusedly aome 
figure to our Bind as being ehil iogon. So, for imagination, 
a special effort of islnd Is necessary which i s not required 
to coneeifiag or understanding} and this special exertion 
of Blind clearly shows the difference between loagination 
and Inte l lec t ion . In a word, vith Descartes, loagination 
i s the faculty of the picturable whereas pure Intel l igence 
or understanding that of the unpleturable. The unpieturable 
part of thought point out the scholastic (or s p i r i t u a l i s t i c ) 
influ(»ice on Descartes, the picturable part I s a clear 
indication of the presence of emi^lcal tendencies in hia. 
The speculative thought, however, started to f a l l 
back into the chaos at the end of 17th century from which 
Descartes had rescued i t . A revival of arysticism and Neo-
Flatonisjs was just In hand. At th i s c r i t i c a l juncture, 
empirical philosophers, John Lock, George Berkeley and 
David Hume aainly, saved the general corpus of philosophy 
from fa l l ing back to degsiatlsffl. 
For our parpoi9« «ttwitlon w i l l b« laalnly fccused on 
David Hune b«oaufl« he not oolf mpresentt culmination of 
Brit ish Ftapirlcal sytteB but a l to h« at once lacked the 
Christian tendenelet vhleh vere highly dooinant in Lock and 
Berkely (B«rkely tooetlfflea raosalned Bishop of Clayne). 
I I . Home wrote after Lock and Berkely vho in a way, had 
their starting point in Rat ional i s ts , partioalarly in 
I^escartes. 'Methodic Doubt' led the philosophers after 
Descartes turn their attention inwards and ezaoiine the 
ob,1eets of their own consciousness so as to solve philoso-
phical probleos. Since the objects of consciousness were 
ideas, they were necessarily required to know the nature of 
ideas and find the relation between perception and ideas. 
In Descartes, the relation between perception and 
ideas i s not much clear because for hia "Whatever we perceive 
are our own IdMis*. Lock's pofit ion i s not ouch different 
froM Descartes, because he also does not find any essential 
dlff«r«nee between perceiving and thinking. For Lock, naving 
ideas and perception are suae thing. The l i n e of deiaarcation 
between perception and idea reisains blurred, again In 
Berkeley, as he points outt 
"It i s evident to anyone who takes a survey of the 
objects of human knowledge that they are either 
ideas (1) actually iiqirinted on the senses, or 
also such as are (5) preceivedl by attending to 
the passions and operations of the lalnd, or la s t ly (3) ideas formed by help of memory and Imagination 
either eoapounding. dividing or barely represent-
ing those original ly perceived in the aforesaid 
ways". 6 
Haa»*8 position i f d i f f w m t from hlf predecessors 
b«eaus« he introdueet • amt dist inct ion betveen *vhat v« 
are avare of in perception* and *vhat ve are awire of in 
thought'• 
"All the perceptions of the hniaan mind resolve 
themaelves into tvo d i s t inc t kinds which I shall 
c a l l impressions and ideas"* 6 
But this diet lnct icn i f not caieh different from 
vhat hie predscesacrs had held because* 
"the *tlff«r«nce betvlvt these ex is t in the degree 
of lore* and livillhoc?rt, with i^ h^nh they str ike 
upon the nind, and mike th««ir way \nto our thought 
or consciousness". 7 
ljapr*«PionB, for Huaie, er© these which enter with 
force • nensaticnSf passions and emotion are a l l Is^ress-
lonp f^nfi "Hr IdfifiR," hfl laeans, the faint l«aa:e« of theae 
8 
in th1nk5nf^  «n^ r*rasr.ninfr". Ai^houph ijBj>re»«ions and ideas 
!^ v«« '?om=' coirvio.f! Anp^r^^B that »P«*» tlrws I t becorwi 
(l? rfii^uIt to '^istln«'urish betvw^w an Inmr^fleion anH an idea, 
for •^ 3r?ir.pl<B, In madn'???* In a f^witr-^ nr in any other violent 
-siaotj.on of thn soul, "bat notwithstanding thia n«>ar retemb-
lance in a ff*^^' instancesi they are in ppn^rel »o different 
that no one can ir;ahe a gcruol*^ to rank thew tmder dis t inct 
9 
h«ad«". 
It ir clear from above that h^ ideas Hurae memng 
ia&ges, loage^iaaking faculty or imagination, in the setting 
of his thcught, plays © very important role in our thinking. 
It supplies laatorlAl to our thiidcing. It i s vtmt * reproduces 
liapresslons' so that ve can thlclc about things in their 
absence, Bit these "reproduced iJi^resalons" are net t& be 
confused vlth aewory b«eause HOSM regards m@iaory and iiuagina-
tioQ as tvo differ ant R e a l t i e s by vhlch ve repeat our 
iii4;>ressions, as he points out in the Section III of t reat i se i 
*'V<hen ve reaeaber &ay past event, the idea of i t 
flows in upon the mind in a forcible aianner; 
vhereas, in the ioagination, the perception i s 
faint and languid, and cannot, without dlffloultyf 
be preserved Isy the mind steady and unifora for 
ai^ considerable time," 10 
IfflBginstion, thus explained, has the l iberty to 
transpose and change i t s ideas; meiBory I s , on the other 
hand, t ied down to produce i t s ideas in the saioe scanner 
as the original impressions are received. Vlth this back-
ground Hume proceeds to distinguish between simple and 
coffiplex ideas . Vlhen lJii|>re8slons come into our minA through 
the senses as s ingle , simple Iteoa, they are simple ideas 
but vhiti different li&prestlons come through aore than one 
sense, a l l at once, these are eonqplmi ideas. Nov i t i s the 
function of iaiBgination to join, In a manner as i t pleases, 
different parts of simple or c o ^ l e x Impressions so as to 
form an idea. Although imagination possesses nothing of 
i t s own; i t only plays upon the material supplied by simple 
or complex Ideas; but i t s function becomes highly Important 
and fundamentally ercitatlve when i t gives new form by combin-
ing the different Ideais. Imagination In th is sense becomes 
an entirely free act ivity* 
Freedofflf according to Hume, Is the msin factor which 
clstlngui»h«s imagination from memory. But this free activi-
ty of imagination i s not random; there i s a certsln bcrKi 
between dlfferp'nt ideas vhlch naturally introduce? one into 
th« other. However, th is bond too, i s not such hard and 
fas t because freedom s t i l l remains the basic characteristic 
of iuteginatlcn. I t i s to ba regarded as a gentle forcp \mich 
cosuaonly prevai ls . 
I t i s now evident from the above exposition that 
for Hume, imagination i s a faculty of 'perfect ideas* whicr 
functions free ly . But some c r i t i c s have chargr-d Hume oi 
changing posi t ions , particularly on the theory of iiaaglna-
tion as put In his two vorks v iz . "Treatise" and "inquiry". 
Ho doubt Hume commits an error in "Treatise" wh«n he concludes 
i t s Section X by saying that "in the warmth of a poetical 
enthusiasm, a poet has a ebunterfeit be l ie f , and e v ^ a 
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kind of vision of his obj«>et8 ,.•*• • implying that imafina-
tifm leads to bel left but he modifiesjthis staton .^f^ nt sulteblv 
in ii-ppendix^ This charge also gets nulif led when Hume 
declares in "EiKjuiry" that i 
"X say, the«i, that bel ief i s nothing but a mere 
vivid, l i v e l y , foroeible , firia, stoady concep-
tion of an ob.ieet, than what the ioaglnatlon 
alone i s ever able to attain ••• the ifitagin&tion 
has the command over a l l i t s ideas , and can jcln 
and mix and very thee, in a l l the ways possible 
• «• tKit i t i s impossible that th i s faculty of 
imagination can ever of i t s e l f , reach be l i e f . . ."12 
It beeoffiet elear troa thlf statesient that Hua« did 
not mean that loaglnatlon ean reach be l ie f . Although vhan 
operatad bgr certain principles , loaginatiLon can ass i s t in 
the production of bel laf bat i t oannot hf i t ae l f reach 
bel ie f . Vihen i t a i s l f t a in the production of bel ief i t s 
freadom la reatrieted hy cuatooa or habits bat when i t la 
only a creative act iv i ty or Fancy, i t enjoys the total 
freedom. In other vords Huae equals iiaaglnatlon vith Fancy 
vhan i t i s freei when i t leads to bel ief i t s freedo^a i s 
restr icted. 
i n . In order to reoognlae an esperienoe, Huisa had a lirai 
be l ie f , as pointed oat in the previous paras, on the ingress-
ions that ve receive from the external vorld. ^hat ve 
actually receive through our senses from the external world 
i s a series of impressions which we generally organise before 
explaining theei. But Kant takes up this problem soaevhat 
differently. He does not bellave that sense impressions 
alone would give us such an experience. We possess the 
experiences of the external world i s a fac t , but senses 
alone can explain thesi fu l ly i s not a fac t . 'Something* be> 
sides the senses i s always at work in a l l our experiences. 
We can neither find nor describe such an experience through 
oar senses. Is i t s e l f a proof for the existence of this 
•something*. In '^Transoendantal Deduction" Kant says: 
**The f irst that i i given \i§ Is the ph^ ROiaenonvVhieb* 
If connected with eonscloasness. i s called pereep* 
tion. As every phenomenon contains a iasnifold. and 
different perceptions are found in the mind singly 
and scattered, a connection of them i s necessarily, 
such as they eaniwt have in the senses by them-
selves. There exists , therefore. In us an active 
pover for the synthesis of the manifold vhich ve 
cal l iiaaginatioa, and the function of vhieh wt 
as applied to perception, I ca l l apprehMision." IS 
This 'power for the synthesis of the loanifold* is 
nothing but imagination it«elf« Kant herelqr suggests a 
treaendous pover of smking inages or representations of 
things* Without this iaage-iaakiBg faculty ve can have no 
experience of the world* But this faculty has been used by 
Kant in two senses, naaely effiprical and Transcendental 
iioagination* l^ mp^ rieal iaaginatlon has been used in the 
sense of inege^Baking* It varies widely frota man to man. 
Transcendental imagination has been used in the sense of 
understaning of the world. It does not change. It Is uni-
versal and remains sane for every one, Kant also uses Re-
productive and productive terms for eaprio&l and transcen-
dental lisaginatlGns. The function of re-productive or 
empVical ioagination depends purely on the association of 
a l l those ideas which we Just happen to have. It works 
entirely subject to empHeal lavs, naaely of association. 
It actually fa l l s within the dooain of psychology. The 
function of productive or tranaoendental imagination i s 
purely constructive and creative. It i s an active power which 
is gracefully natural and unconstrained. The distinction 
between reproductive and productive imagination oan bo 
explained by an i l lu s t r f t t i on af te r F ,J , Furlcng {Xmaflnation), 
' On e cold wlntrr evenlag I see through a vlndow, as I PM.9B 
by, the leaping flasies of a good f i r e . I think of I t s wariath 
the crackle of the wood and h i s s of the ccol but these , a l a s , 
I do not f€€il or hear' • I t i e purely the sensory part of our 
fcnovjl€dfce vhich i s t o t a l l y chaotic and unorganised. This 
thinking iiant c a l l s reproductive or eaiprical iceglnri t lcn. 
I t iy whe s i a p l a s t , bod rock ?rfnd of iBiaglnation* 'But ay 
thinklns f.oes not stop here. I think of the br ight appeajranee, 
the yar:«-„h, the cracVao and the h iss linked tce'^thPr. Why? 
"or '^ '.{jAcMiatlon I auct go back to ^ot^'i^ past occasion on 
-which I l ea rn t about f l ros* Then I va« avftr^ of b"H phtnest 
•jy s igh t , of varmth br f^?l lns or crncVlln^ b^ h'?aT"'ng, This 
i s a ' ranifold* t^.at la glv^n to n'»', This , scnord'inf: to 
; C i n t , I r th«^  transcendental synth^si? or 5.'T'fi';'l-^atlcn bncauae 
ix knovlGdga I s to bo rjade posa lb l - t ien t h i s a'^i^fold ntatt 
b? bound tog"«h3r ! • « , to bs syntherlz- 'd, ^t Is ^ nd" 
sn t s l becaur- i t i s s ocndit ioa of, not a r e su l t of ^xperi-
€nc«. I t i s puraly the i n t e l l e c t u a l part of oar Vnowledgp 
of th* v.'orld. I t consis ts cf our having ' ibstract CTJfc^pta 
about th ings . 
From t h i s brief exposi t loc , l3\«iglnation, in Fant, 
vheth^r easpjricsl or t ranscendenta l , ac tual ly l i e s soae^rticre 
betveen the sensory and I n t e l l e c t u a l per t cf our knowledge. 
For the erpertenc* of the '«^rld, as ve havr i t , the sensory 
part of our knovlBdgt i s as neoessary as our Intellectual 
part. £^ an aaalgamatloA of sensory knovladgojand Intellaet-
uaX kncArfledge only can ve have tba exporlance of the vorld* 
But this synthesis of the two i s not autooatle. It i s th« 
function of isnglnation to join thasa tvo parts of our 
knoidedge so that a correct picture of the vorld i s given 
to us. Independently neither sensation nor understanding 
can do the vork of itnagination* Separately they are passive 
and non*creative| hence unable to produce images* Inagina-
tion on the other hand brings them togethsr and gives the 
real picture of the vorld. In this aenao imagination i s 
highly eraiitive and active in nature. This activity i s 
also called 1^ Kant as apprehension. 
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B O H A S T I C 
PRRIOD 
VI In ideaJLlsa, ea^xriclsia ox Kant*« phlloBoi^y th» 
problta of laaglnation esient la l ly fpringo froo their 
eplstoaology. The rol« ixaaglnatlon plays In the "wt^le 
hunian thought, ia highly appreciated by aloest a l l th« 
philosophers, 7©t the chronic disagreement between their 
basic philosophical positions assigned varied and contra-
dictory functions to i t , 'While Descartes ca l l s i t to be 
sooivhat low«r aental act ivi ty (as in Plato)f Haae escribes 
to i t the important role of combining slaple or coa^lase 
idaas and iijant efl^hasises i t s productive and reproductive 
character. The treatment of the subject by these philosophers 
in so far as I t s functioning in practice Is coocernedi is 
however, not as elaborate as I t s treatoent by the a r t i s t s 
and l l t e r a t e u r s . On a>ost of the points^ a r t i s t s and l i t e r s -
teurs do not subscribe to the vlevs of the philoaophers. As 
creativi ty i s essentially a free asntal act ivi ty i t recmins 
a 
uaoooKltttd to asQr partieular '"aat-prooedute**. AXaost al l 
the a«t proeeduras laad to dost&atian, hwoea lrralav«it to 
t]ti9 basic spirit of leBagiaatlon. ^9 mayi for xiiXz purpos«t 
briefly surrey tiie writing a of some dlstlzigulahed literary 
writer a in order to arrive at certain cooelualon. 
Coleridge tuoA Wordatforth are ooaald@red to be tiie 
290st important contrlbutora to the theory of Imagination in 
the leth century. From Kant onwarda (iriiere we had dropped 
our dlaousslon) there la alBost none iBsept Coleridge that 
oould attract our attention* MoreoTe^Coleridge has the 
honour of introducing, for the f lrat tlme» German thoughts 
to the t^gllah world* 
Heocrdliig aone diaagreecoent with Wordavorth, in a 
latter % ^tneby, Coleridge espluttioally holda preoeption 
to be a gateway to Imaginetloni he aayat 
*A great poet muat be lapUcl t i f not expUclt. 
a proFound meti^thyaielan* He B>ay not have I t In 
logical coherence, In his Brain and TOngue •••• 
but he must have the ear of a wild Arab 11 a tan* 
lx« in the allent deaert, the eye of a Horth 
iaerlean Icdian tracing the footatepa of an 
Eneisy upon the leavea that atraw the Foreatf .^ 
This i s a clear statement about the relation between 
p«rtteption and laagliMttion* Stress orer * ear and eort* and 
'*" tracing ehe footatepa** aakea perception an esaential element 
for imagination* 
*a* ''Set proAeduriT i s to imply a l l those thought systems 
viilch lead and focua their attention on a certain and 
predetermined goal-« purely unaeientific approaoh* 
Saeh 8 relationship between th« two aakes ioagimtion not 
only dependent upon peroeptlon but *ke©ner t t e psrceptlon 
greater the laagioatloHi'. Keen perception hewsirer does not 
Imply earJrleal «Mrperlencef I t I s the cult ivat ion of the 
internal powersf i t i s the exploration of the depths of 
inner 8©lf» As Coleridge writes in his fa^ :K;tur "Dejection 
an ode": 
*'Ab, froffl the soul i t s e l f oust issue forth 
A l igh t , a glory, a fa i r loaiiious cloud 
Biaeveloping the earth 
md from the soul i t s e l f isust there be sent 
A sveet and potsnt foieej of i t s own b i r th , 
Of a l l sweet tounda the l i f e and element 
• • • • • • • • • 
7here was a tliae vhen though URT path was rough 
This iof within m dal l ied with d i s t ress 
Md a l l slafortunea were bat a« the stuff 
vmenee faixty aadle ae dreams of happiness*** 2 
£een percepticai culsdnates, as depictod in these 
l ines , in the fe^ -^ llm? of joy. This Joy I s something l ike a 
llffht, a glory, a fa i r luadnous cloud «iv6loping the ©arth, 
whose aalRosprlng la the soul i t se l f , "things are beauti* 
ful» can be known by perception but to feel the beauty of 
things la the funotioo of t h i s poetic joy, Vheo perception 
penetrates the extreme depths of tmmm fssistance, poetic 
joy evolves. Itiis i s i#hat Coleridge issiplies ioagination to 
be. 
But penetration into the ^treiae depths of huiaan 
exiatance i s neither s i i i ^e nor easy because exploration 
of these depths i s not possible by sere intrc/spoction. I t 
la difficult iMicauae lt« object i« th« tran«c©odental self, 
not th© eoplrical self. And \^ iatev@r l3 true of tbo tf^ns^ 
ctu4ental self i s true of th© vbole jsanklnd. In this st^te 
i.fc, in iioa^inatlon, tho perceplcnt and th« pere^f«<l bo-
ccQ© one- as ^Icridga «ayai-
"• . . . I think of th© vai l - It la bctfore ne, a 
distinct laag« • h«re« Z iieeasaerlly think of 
the Idee and the thlnkins; I aa tvo distinct and 
oppoait« thinf a* Kow l«t ae think of cQrself- of 
tha thinkixag being, Tha idea bacoioaa dlia^ what-
ever i t mtf be • 80 dia that I knov not vhat i t 
i s - But tno fsoling i s desp and staedy and this 
I cal l "!•' identifying the p«rc<3plent and the 
perceived", 3 
In perception the idea and the thinking self are 
I»lea apart. But in Imagirmtloni vhen ve think, of the aelf-
•of the thlnklns being* the distance between Idea and the 
thinking teix self in bridged. Deeper the ealtlvation of 
the internal senses lesser the distance, ant11 a stage 
r^iches vhen the subject and the object beeoae idantleal. 
This i s ttis concept of self or "1** in Coleridge, iwv vhat-
ever this '*self** or "1" axpresaes i s iaaginatlon or poetic 
joy. 
Iiaaginatioa so eoneeived is further analysed by 
Qoleridge as priaary and secondary laagination. In one of 
his iaportant stateoents in "Blographa LlteriralS he sayst 
rrhe imagination then I consider as Prlaary or 
Secondary, The prlaary laagination I hold to be 
the living povar and prias agent of a l l huaen 
perception and as a repetition in the Infinite 
I AH, The seccmdary I consider as an echo of 
th9 f o r w r , coexlftlng with th« con»cioaJi v l U . y e t 
s t i l l at i d ^ t l e a l with th« Brinary In th« kind of 
i t s ageney, and diftaring ttily in degree and in tha 
laode of i t« op^at ion . I t dlaaolves, dlffuaas, dla-
•ipatesf l a order to reereatef or yhev th l i pro-
eesa la rendered iapoaalble^ yet a t i l l at a l l 
events i t atrugglet to ideal ize and amfy. I t i s 
essent ia l ly v i t a l , even as a l l ob^eets (as objects) 
are essent ia l ly fixed and dead**, 4 
The sole fmotion of prinary Imagination is the percep-
tion of the vorldj hence mainspring of knowledge. Secondary 
inagination, although an echo of the primary imagination i s 
yet different from it# It i s identical with prioary iiaagina-
tion only in kind| i t d i f fers from i t in degree as v e i l as in 
the Qoae of i t s operation. Secondary loaginatioa i s to some 
extent identical with Kant's transcendental iisaginatlon but 
somewhat different froa what HUBS regards i t . Imagination, 
in Hume, unifies simple or coisq;>lat ideas so as to create a 
new id«a. But in cx>leridge Secondary imagination dissolves , 
diffuses , d iss ipat«i so as to create a new idea* Moreover 
according to Coleridge, things are in themselves fixed and 
dead. Imagination, which i s v i ta l in nature, works not only 
as a unifying agent but in the process of creat iv i ty , gives 
l i f e to the fixed and dead things* 
lasglnation, in this perspective, can neither be a 
memory nor a rehearsal of mental images because i t unifies 
not only the different elements of experience but unifies 
even contradictories. It i s perhaps for this reason that 
Coleridge coins the word •*eseflq>lastic** for imagination because 
i t i f the ideal vajr of expressing a faculty vhleh should 
stand for "shaping into one** a l l contradictories. 
VII Wordsvorth's position i s somewhat different from 
Coleridge beeause at the end of an i l lus tr ious career of 
poetic creat ivi ty (froa 1770 to 1850 ^ ) he ultimately 
agreed with the Kantian thes is that aesthetic ideas, ideas 
tovards vhich imagination reached in art and poetry, could 
not be eo£q)let€^ly expressed in vords* Aecordinglyi iamgina-
tlon in Wordsworth aiias towards that v^ilch i t cciild never 
vholly 8»^ *«P» H» iK>wever deals with the concept of laaglna-
tion in the preface to the lyr ica l Ballads in ?li4^(tly 
different m&nner* 
"The principal objeot. ttieni proposed in these 
poeas was to choose in^ldMits end situations 
froB ooauaon l i f e • •«• to throw o^er thea a 
certain colouring of ioagination . . . to i3ak.e 
these incidents and s i tuations interesting by 
tracing in them truly, the primary L i^vs of nature. "S 
Lat^r in the sadte preface, ;;>or6swcrth, v>il€ dis -
cussing wiiat a poet i s and to whom dtee he address hiaself 
furni&nes a pretty specif ic acccunt of v^ a^t Iht poet's 
iaagination wi l l actually do. V.bile h« dignif ies poet as 
"endcwec with jaore l ive ly sens ib i l i ty enthuj^iasm and tender-
6 
ness ••• than are supposrd to be cofuaon aEcng Kiii^klnd", he 
points out that apart from these qua l i t i e s , he ha* a "dis-
position to be affected laore than other men by obst^nt things 
as If they were present, an ab i l i ty of conjuring up in him-
self psflslons, vhlch are Indeed far from being th« same as 
those produced by r ea l events i yet • • • d o nore resemble the 
passionp prrxSucPd by rf^el ^vpnts . , , whence, and from pract-
i c e , be has acquired a grea ter readiness and especial ly 
thoi?e thoughts which by h is o%n choice, or from the s t ruc ture 
of h is own n?nd a r i s e In hln \dthout laraedlate external 
7 
*»xeltem*^nt". 
A pcet 1*5 a nan ^ o la 'a f fected i'5or« than other men 
by Absent tWinjs* Is a c lear stat^nirnt about the function of 
^nwaglnetlon. A r t i s t s and IJ^lteratures hevfl to nake such 
lir#-?f'$ as I f thGj- wcr? present . They have to conjure up 
such evictions -which are ne t only far f ros the eaotlons arous-
ed by the r ea l ey mts but slioald a t tho saiue titoa x^semble 
the emotions and fe.-l ings tha t are proUuctd i-.y the rea l 
f^vpnts. It!? ism*-forsAnf vvl^ i s oL-vlvus fro^i zbij s t a t e -
ment. Hence the fcesic function of Injeglnatlon 1^ to enable 
us not only to think but to fnel the thin!?s vh<?n th«=»y are 
not p resmt to our percrrption and to reproduce the i r ioagas 
vhlch are Idf 'ntleal to the r ea l eiaotlons arousrd bv the r e a l 
" vents,. 
At t h i s point Wordsworth seerar to d i f fe r from 
Ccler ldg"; vhl le Cclerldj^c s t r e s ses upon perception, V-ords-
wc-rth dees ne t . In Coleridge perception i s not only e s sn t l a l 
ground of but s leo a gEt«%?ay to ioaglnat lont in V crdsvcth, 
lEi^glnation can v/ork even when there I s no peTcrptlon, when 
tb« ftocual thiog* «r« aot prta«it* Shis do«t not tiov«T«r 
lAply tliat In Mordfvorth laaglo&tion ! • dtipold of p«reiQ>-
tlon* In fact th« iB«gln«tlon to vi:iioh rfojrdaworth r^fvrs 
o)C tbe Imac^t uiileb « poet fom* i s •flsentially rooted In 
peroeptlon* Abt«ie« of pereeption ! • no obstaole for th« 
artist* fl Ij&aglnational In this oasa haoan easily torn tiie 
Images of tbe pereelTed things Igr his Imaglm tlve po j«r« 
Fereeptaial knovledget either present or not. Is absolutely 
necessary for Imagination beeaase nothing comes froei above, 
trom Told* Henoe In esseneet Wordsvorth does not differ 
froB Coleridge espeelally on the role of perception In 
Imagination* 
Again, one of the best exacples of imagination In i t s 
laag«*forming role Is befoitirully eKpreased by Wordsworth In 
" !£Qe Fodlar** { as he vrltess 
"Wolle yet a child and long before nls time 
He nad pereelTed the presence and the power 
<}f greatness* and de^ q^  feelings l^ g3'^  Impressed 
Great ob;leots on his mind, vlth portraiture 
And colour so distinct that on his mind 
lliey lay l ike aubstanees, and almost seemed 
To haunt the bodily sense* He hed received 
A precious gift , for as he grew In years 
vlth these Impressions would he s t i l l compare 
.ill his Ideal stores* his shapes and fones, 
4nd being s t i l l unsatisfied vlth aught 
of dimmer character, he thence attained 
An active power to faster Images 
upon his brain, aod on their pictured l ines 
XnXtensely brooled. even t i l l they acquired 
'fhe l ivel iness of dreams* Wor did he fa l l 
vblle yet a child, with a child's eagerness 
Incessantly to turn his ear and eye 
on a l l things which the rolUx^ season brought 
lx> feed such apatite* Nor this alone 
Appeased his yearning} in the after day 
of boyiioodt majoy an iiotir in eaftt forlorn 
And in tbo taollow doptkui of nmkod eraga 
H« aatt and avan in their fixad linaanantai 
or from tha povar of peculiar 979^ 
or by eraatiTa faaling ovarbomat 
or Igr pradoninanea of taught opprataad. 
ST«n in thair fixad and steady linaananta 
Ha tn^ad on abing and a flotdng mind 
acpraaaion oTar TaTyinc.** 
2ha «aotiont and faaling of ohildhood tfcparianaad in 
youth days prasmt thsBsalTas in tha fom of laagasi Aapaa 
and eoloura* Wordsworth holds that tha funotion of iaagina* 
tlon baeoma nor a powerful and striking in tha absanoa than 
in preswsBe of the objeots of perception* The poet 
traverses a long path of understanding since he f i r s t 
observed than* If ha i s able to express then suooaaafullyt 
the sKperianoa of a particular individual at a particular 
moBant beeoae the axperienee of the whole nankind and for 
a l l times* Sliat i s ^atiy Wordsworth oftenly s^tes that i f we 
are able to fom the iaages of things in the sindy we can 
understand th«K store fully and accurately* 
HcMever* reference to tbe shapesi foiss or isiages in 
the above poes are somewhat paadoxical in nature* l iey show 
SOBS uncoimscious bawild«*ment of the poet» which i s sn 
indication of the anbiguity of perception* Ihis ssubiguity 
of p«rc«pi&ion i s resioved i f ' t^e Pedlor's' childhood iatpress-
ions beeaaae cl«»ar. Wordsworth holds that perceptual clearance 
i s iffipossible unless full understanding inspired by imagina-
tion Qomea to the poets aid* From this i t follows that 
understanding iS depeiulant on inaginationa* Qraatar 
the power of imagira tion greater the underatanding| lesser 
tlM uibiguity of perception* Slnoe the asblgui^ of 
pereoptlonOi^o^ ®^ oc«plet«ly «radioat«d boeauM Vtordto-
worth has already told us that iBagicatloaaiimot axpraas 
Itsalf ooBplataly la worda, ao tha prasanoa of aBbigaitar 
in '^ Tha Padl&r** la also a Muat* 
I t la also avldsnt fron tha poaai that tha fui]etlo& 
of iaiafiinatioa la to area tat rapcoduoa and undaratand al l 
thoaa thoughta which Uia poat axpariaooad in tha ncHiianta 
of aana-pareapUon without azgr t^ iaa bar* cil&ultauaoualy 
i^ i s alao elb&r that Mordaworth did ix>t| in atqr wax^  
follow tha profaaaional philosophara lika iiuaia, Kant or 
aosr other philosophical ays ten* A likeoesa with theae 
philosopxiers ia juat aocidental in hi». Beoauae what ia 
reproduotive imaginatioa in Kant and a enae-impressiona in 
HuBe. wordawortii oalla Lhaa imagea and shapes* To the extent 
of likenesa ^rdaworth can be aaid to have been influmeed ^ > 
theae philaopuars but i t would be wrong to naintain that 
he followed thoa intentionally or in aiqr way plagiriaed 
their ideaa* 
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C O ! « T E M P C R A R Y 
PERIOD 
Hav ye shall p&9s on to Wittg^steln'8 views on this 
subject giving a brief account cf th« nev trends Q£ ptiilosc 
ghy in the goth Century, (The ehciee i s soiacwhat arbitrary 
IS not causal). 
Our century has vitnessed a rapid change in aliaost 
al l the departments of human l i f e . As oftenly claiDied 
natural sciences have coiae of age, Siadlarly philosopty has 
also tried to resolve centuries old controversies vith 
emphasis upon proper methodology. Although It i s difficult 
to pin-point the peaks philosopty has touched but at the 
turn of the century a revolution started which i s not, at 
yet, over. But this revolution is not the f i r s t of i t s kind; 
i t Is th« Snd revolution in the history of philosophy* In 
th« f irs t revolution vhioh was inspired by advancement of 
Seienoes and thair separation from philosoptqr a l l s\3§h 
questions vhioh vere either eopirieal or foroal vere dit* 
entangled from philosophy*' These vere sueh questions vhieh 
have by now established as fal*fledged departments in the 
name of AstronoflQr, Mathemttics, physics, psychology, Biology 
etc. Previously they vere part and parcel cf philosophy* 
In the second revolution, heralded by the 20th century, such 
problems as the 'Fxistanoe of God', the *aeaning of Life*, 
the *metaphysical theories* etc* vere to be divorced froa 
the so called philosophy Proper, which aimed at develop-
ing a metaphilosophy. 
This turnover of philosoptqr in our century vas not 
random^ i t had very strong reasons* Its main reason vas 
thai in the last phase of the I9th century, while Scientists 
vere engaged in reducing their disagreemmts, philosophers 
were very badly suffering from the chronic controversies 
among themselves} while Scientists vere droping or reducing 
the points of disagreement, philosophers vere multiplyiag 
their disagreements. This resulted in a revolution in the 
form of diverse SC!K>O1S of thought* The most important of 
these schools of thought are Analytical Philosophy and 
Fxistentlal Philosophy. A* the Exlitential thought wil l be 
discuss.in the next chapter, a brief exposition or an oat-
line study of the analytical phlloaophy with particular 
r«f«r«nee to Lodvlg Wittgenttela vllX b« and«rt«k«Q h«r«. 
AoalytlcAl philosophjr la uaaally considered to be an 
approach rath«r than a phllosopl^ because as a coneapt I t 
not only analyses the baslo phllosophlcaX questions but I t 
Is supposed to be purely neutral %dthout favouring ax^ world 
vlev. But this approach Is in no sense an entirely nev 
appruJBch in philosophy because analysis in some sense or 
the other has been Inseparable froa systeiuatlc thinking. The 
only difference betveen earl ier philosophers i . e . the 
speculative philosophers and the analytical phllc^phers is 
that Qost of the aiodem analytical philosophers hold that 
speculation i s laethodologlcally Isproper because i t i s un-
ver i f ieble . Uftlike speculative philosophers, analytical 
phllowjphers, functionally speaking, equate philosophy with 
clarif icat ion of concepts. The main interest of these 
philosophers i s to analyse l inguis t ic or conceptual uni ts . 
They vant to understand the structure of language bf * care-
ful stu^y of i t s elexaants and their in ter-re la t ions vlthout 
confusing the© vith other is^jortant studies of language, 
All the analytical philosophers agree that the study 
of language is of the greatest la^jortanoe but they differ on 
the point as to which language siust profitably be studied hy 
the philosophers. I t i s here that a basic s p l i t among thesf^ 
philosophers has occured. While one group advocates that 
philosophical analysis must construct a new a r t i f i c i a l 
languag* wywttan others hav* propoaiKiod a oareful analfslf 
of th« ordinary language ve use to coissittaleata vlth 
each othar. The foriaer are known at logical posi t iv ists , 
the latter aa Unguis t i e analytit. 
Being mainly ooneerned vith the vholesale elimina-
tion of aetaphyilcal theories, logical positlvlata were 
least i n t e r e s t s in the ooncepts like iiaagination. They 
vould, If thejr could, plae»? this concept also in the eate* 
gory of unfsrifl^^l* hence •non-sense*• Bat the approach 
of the lan^uagift-philosophers i s soaewhat dlffsrant. 
Ungustle analysis Is a naae j?iv«B to a number of 
philosophers vho, inspite of their dJ.fferences^ share certain 
eoBBQon interest in use of language of philosoi^yy thus hav-
ing 'faadly r«»<>i8blance'. Thusaest iJ^K>rtant f i ^ r e of 
this aoaent in i t s early development vac Ludvlg Wtttgeofteln 
vhose Blue and Brown Books and the Fhilosophieal Investiga-
tions nscst aptly represent this approth to philosophy/. 
'Wltttgwiateln iiscass*i the coneept of imagination 
in a ocnteart tmch wider than the scope we er* her^ concerned 
with. Hi? tr^atfsent of the problea of laases and the object 
of the eart«»rnal world they refer to , and th^lr relatlonahip 
vlth eeoh other Is quite g«»ie?el. There is no direct state-
ment about iTQ^rBtlon either in his »Blae and Bro^ n Boc^' 
or in his 'Philosophical InvestifjatIons': w« have, however 
BomB hlnti here and th«re vhleh smj b« threaded to construct 
Wittf«oateiniB vl«v on liaaglnation* 
In Bluft Book Wittgenstein rejects the view of many 
philosophers who considered W.nd «s some sort of storehouse 
where loages not only l ive but Intermingle, develop and icTOi 
new Ideas) wh»n these Images are r«?ferred to, or evoked by 
the objects of the external world or by the sentences or 
wordsf they give oeanlng and l i f e to these words* "there 
is a kind of general disease of thinking whioh always looks 
for (and finds) what would be called a a»ntal state from 
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which a l l our acts spring as from a reservoir," 
One of the striking ezaaples of this fallacy could 
be found in ii\im wtlMi he distinguishes between Is^ressions 
and ideas. '^ Those perceptions which «at«r with JK>st force 
and violence, we nay nana iaipressions ••.*• By id««s I 
mta the faint linages of these in thieddng and reasoning" 
Sartre, whose approach Is purely phenoiaenologieal (which 
v l l l be disseussed in the next chapter), also rejects 
Huaeo view clalaing that the philosophers coamt this 
fallacy because thsy think in space and in terias of space,' 
Wittgenstein also rejects the possibility of any store-
house of iioftges in our laind. 
Philosophers generally consider that a word rafers 
to a particular imge in our mind thereby giving l i f e to 
the vordi making I t Q»aiiingfal» Viittgeinatein presumes ttwt 
"we could perfectly well . . . , . • replace every process of 
Imagining by process,looking at an object or by painting, 
drawing oodellingt and every process of speaking to oneself 
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by speaking aloud or by writing." Wittgenstein holds th«t 
i f the meaning of a sign i s an linage bui l t up in our minds 
and if this aental laage i s replaced by 
an outward object %hen the laoment iiaage lose i t s recandlte 
nature, i t ceases to provide any meaning^ any l i f 3 to the 
wottt «r the sentence, Ee further eaya, "-..e part of the 
systeffi of language, one oay say, the sentonce has l i f e . But 
one i s teapted to iaagine that which glv<^s the s nt^noe 
l i f e as something in a occult sphwe ecccmpfenyinE the 
sentence. Bit whatover acccmpanied i t would • . • » . . Just be 
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another sign", 
Wittgenstein, however, tioes not refutethe «^lstence 
of ImigBs and their use in our thinking proe&sf?* Tinges 
e:slst, but they are not objects as such) they vurk only at 
aids or laeans to our thought-process b^'cause they are the 
meaningful items of our oacperiencp. There i s no wuch thing 
as an occult sphere vhlch a^akea a sentence meaningful and 
i f at a l l anything aoeoapanles i t that w i l l i t s e l f be an* 
other sign. But the d i f f i cu l ty witLoh arises la t'fett when 
"we trdLnk about things • • . • • how do these things inter our 
thoughts'? We think about ilr Solth ^ but ^ie iiiJiith need not 
be present, i- pic tare of hla won't do, for hov are we to 
know vihoiB It repretents? In fact no substitute for hia 
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will do« Then Iww ean he himself be object for our thought." 
If the irdnd Is at a l l considered to be a storehouse 
containing numberless linagesi as vas held by Huiae, then the 
fiK>i»8nt ve thirds: alxmt Hr Smith the Idea or the lamge of 
i'lr. Smith coiaes out of storehouse and the liaage Is presented 
The question vhlch VHttgensteln raises Is that hov do ve 
knov as to vhojs does our liaage represent. \^hen I think 
about Tess, Tess v l l l not be present] a photo of her v U l 
not serve purpose because that Is not sure to belong to her. 
So the only vayout ,1^  Ittg^nsteln thinks Is not to concentrate 
on Images or where they l ive bat tev do ve Interpret® themi 
how ve make them meaningful and hov do ve ImpE^ rt l i f e to 
them. 
Mcordlngly In *philosophical Investigation*, 
Vilttgensteln does not focus his attention on ioages or on 
the nature of images but i s eoncarncd tow the vord image or 
liaaglnatlon Is used and hov do ve interprete i t . He says: 
"Cne ought to ask not vbat images are or what 
happens when ona imagines some thing« bat hev 
the vord 'imagination* i s used. But that does 
not mean that I vant to talk only about words. 
For tha question as to the nature of the imagin* 
atlon is as much about the vojpd * imagination', 
as mr question i s . And I am only saying that 
this question is not to be divided, neither for 
the person who doat the imagining nor for any-
one else, by pointing, nor yet by a description 
of any process". 6 
Th« point which V^ittgeniteln vants to bring out i s 
not to "Explain what an image i s but he strongly s t resses 
the need to know the use of the vord imagination and how 
we i n t e r p r e t e i t , A deararlption of what goes on while 
imaelnin^ wi l l not c o n s t i t u t e an answer to the question 
what laifisTinin? i s . However, an exposit ion of the re le t lon 
betw'«>n vhat we say about the loage i , e , how we use and 
i n t e r p r e t e i t , and what we say about the object of which 
i t ia an inage wi l l bring to ligjllt the nature of imagining. 
For t h i s purpose V.ittgenstein says "you could imagine the 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , -, 
/ 
appearing in severa l places In a book, a text-book for 
ins t ance . In the r t avant t ex t something d i f fe ren t ia in 
queation rvery tlraei here ^ gUas cube there an inverted 
op^n box, there a wire a frame of tha t shapa, th^^re thrf« 
boarcia fortting & sol id angle , :.ach t l a e the t ex t supplies 
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the i n t e rp r e t a t i on of the l l l a s t r a t l o n . 
The aiain point of t h i s example i s to show the twin 
aspect of the seme thing v3^ , seeing an aajcct and in terpre t -
Ing vhat we see i n a pa r t i cu la r way. In both Ci^scs (and 
in t he i r d e t a i l s which Wittgenstein a iscusses e t lor.gth;, 
there i s almost no ro le of images or imagination. He how-
ever, descr ibes a pa r t i cu l a r kind of aspect seeing where 
iaRglnatlon ! • r«qaired« And In order to sbov vher« ye Qe«d 
loBglnation and vhera ve don't netd i t , h« giv«i the exaapl* 
of a t ra ingla . 
/ 
There are varied aspects of a tralnglef for exaople, the 
same traingle ean be seen as a traingaXar hole^ as a geo« 
meterloal dravlngt us a iaountaln, as a xiedge and various 
otlier things* Nov the qaestlon i s bov i s I t possible U> see 
an object ©ccowUns to an ioterpretai ion. Vllttgenateln's 
?r*ln ansver to this qu^sj^tlon I s t t e t " i t i s as li" un laage 
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cane Intc erntaet vilh the visued iapression," This Is 
v^st s-©lng fiMcording tc interpretat icn laj I t i s to hafe 
an IflBPge vhlch beers upon tf» iaaaediate contact with the 
vl.5U£l lopreir 'pne. »dttgfnst<?in, hcjvic-v r^, liitroiluced an-
cthpr tfpc* cf aspect seelrig v.1iich he C:&li8 'duublb cross*. 
This can b« taken either as a vhlte cross en a black 
background or as a black eroes on a vhlte background. The 
description of the alternating aspect wil l be of dl lfereat 
kind in each ease. These two aspects can hovev^r be reported 
simply b7 pdnt lng a.Xternati¥ely to an ' i solated vhlte and 
an isolated black cross*. 8© in reporting as to vhat we see iJi 
seeing m aspect of the double cross i s to point to a part 
of the double cross . Wlttgenetein concludes th^ «l t Is 
poflflia« to t«k« the dosKL* eroti slapljr for tti« plettir« of 
a black erois, bat not to t«k« tho bar« tr«liigttl«r flgar* 
for th« pleture ci «o objoet that haa fallen ov«r« to #•• 
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thla aspaot of tbo tralngla daisanda laagination.** 
Thia laada aa to Infar that tha traingle a«an aa a 
pietur«^ of a fallen objeet la tean aa a plctura of SOIB«-> 
thinf vhioh la threa dlaenelonal, vhHa itaalf, oonaiderad 
aa llnea on the page It la tifo dlaenalonal. laagimtlofi la 
reqalred to aee the tralngla aa a pleture rather than a 
dlagrao* Viith reapeet to tha aeelng as aapeot Vilttganateln 
adda that "the concept of an aapeot la akin to the concept 
of an lfl«ge« In other vorda the coneept 'I aa now a«elng It 
la ••••* la akin to *Z as new hating thla laage • . . . Seeing 
an aapeot and ioaglnlng are aabjeot to the vl l l« There la 
aueh an order aa 'laaglne th laS and alaot Nov aee the 
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figure l ike thla) hat nott Hov aeo thla leaf groan.'* 
Xaaglnation therefore, to go vlth Htrrr Viarnook la 
our aeana of Interpreting the vorld, and It la also our 
asans of foralng laagea In the nlnd. The laagea theaaelvea 
are not aeperate froa our Interpretatlona of tha vorldfthey 
are our way of thinking of the objecta In tha vorld, y^B aee 
theae very foraa In our oinda and v« aee theae very foroa 
In the vorld. Ue could not do one of theae things If we 
could not do tha other. Tha t%io abl l l t lea are joined In our 
ability to undaratand that the foroa have a certain oeanlng, 
r f^ 
that th«7 alvftjri signiff oth«r thing! biyond thcMelv«^a. 
Via raeogBisa a fora aa a totm of aoaathlng, aa In l^ttganataln 
aald, hf ita ralation with other thinga. 
!• Wltt(«»t6iii, ladwig, "Tftf B3.Bf Mft Bwm Bwtet ojcford, 
Bantll BlaekveXl (londoiii 1958), p. 143* 
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6. Wlt«g«iurt«lii, Iiidvlg, IMtottBhiBiJ. IJBtWttgfUOflit 
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So f tt «« ti«v« diaou««*d varloos loterpret&tloos of 
the natarci and faiwtlon of laagiiiatieii froa Plato to Witt* 
Ceect«lA. In tha l i ght of tha above diacuaalon nov ve nay 
turn to Sartre*a payehoXogy of loaginatloa. I t eaonot be 
aeperatad froa hla oatology as a nhole, of vhieh i t la an 
iatefral part* Ajbriaf expoaition of the oialii eoneeptlon in 
hla phlloaophy ! • eaa<mtial before proeeedlng to analyae hia 
theory of iauigination. 
The leadiac figure of the eziatential aovcoaat and 
a noble laarette (though deellnad to reoeite i t ) , J.P.Sartre, 
ia eonai dared to be the atrongeat exponent of the deapalre 
of the poat»var generation of the v«at. A declared atheiat 
but a thorough hnoiniat and highly aeeular, he haa a noobar 
of playa and novela to hia erodit vhloh are the beat expresa-
iona of hia exiatential exparieoae and outlook at ereative lefel, 
tf» liit«Il«etoa]. d«f«lepanit of J«P» 8artr« eaa )>• 
dlvl404 Into thrve phaaei* The ph«aoai«9ologle«l psjrebology, 
«hieh la oontidey^d to be th« f i r t t ph«««9 IncIudM hla 
thf— n l a voika v l s | 'Traateendanoe of EKO* (1936), * ^ 
akatch for the theory of eaotlona* (1939) and *The Zjaaglna-
tioa*(1940)« While deaeriblAg the atraeture ot ooi4lo«iaiieai, 
in theae three wrkat Sartre ooMea iinf eloae to Hoaaeral 
bnt alowly detiatM from hia and eatabllahea a poaitioa 
eloae to Heldaggar* Hla Ontologjr !• eoaaidered to be 
aecond and the aoat iaportaat pbaae of hla latelleetual 
deffaopaant beeauae I t Inelodea hla aalB work *Beliig and 
Hothingneaa* and *Exlat«ntlalia« aad HaoaniaiB*. Sinee hla 
flrat phaae had led hi« tovards a poaitloa vhleh vaa akin 
to Hcddeggar, In hia aeaood phaae alao ha la ao n«ar to 
Hedeggarlaii thought that * Being and Nothlogneaa* la aooe-
tinea eonaldered «a an aagpllfled reatateaeiit of the doetrlnea 
ezpresaed Iqr Heidegger la hia book *Sein and 2ieit*« Critique 
of I>laleatlaal Eeaaon* f&Ua ttt hia third and final phaae 
of the reatateaaant of Hutxim in e i iatential iat teraa. 
l ike other exiatantial philoaophera, Savtre'a 
philoeophsr alao apringa froa an analyaia of Being* Bert hia 
treatawt of Being la not aabjeative aa th«t of Keiekegaard 
It la aainlr beoanae Sartre*a phileaophjr la aproprlaitie In 
prlneiple, heoee atrlatlr rational. 
Sartre atarta hla 'Being and Hothingnesa* with a 
categorle&l rejection of the tradlticnal philoaophiea duallsa 
of balBc aa^ App«ar«Ma vldoh *oppof«d th« Intarlcr to th« 
«xt«rioy in tho taao islstaiit** •thore i t no Longer a& 
axtorlojr for tho exittont If ono aa&Af Iqr that a «Bp«rfiel8l 
eovoring vhlch hidoa fro« fIgtit tho true nature of tha 
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objoat*" Tha traditional piklloaophlea tiad oalntaloed tht 
dualisa of baing and ai^aaranea to itteh an axt^t that tha 
appaarnaoa had baaa prefaelfcad as a pore negative thing* 
Sartra holds that '^ If ve no longer baliave in tha being* 
behind»the appaaransef than the appearance besoms full 
posltlvitf^ i t s assense i s an 'appearing* vhieh is no loiter 
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opposed to being but on the eontrary is the oeasure of it". 
Sib idiat appears of an existant i s snetljr equivatlent to i ts 
being» neither aore nor less* It does not Indleate sons 
traa b«lttg vhleh voold be^  for i t absolute. It reavels it* 
self as i t isI i t is absolutely vtoataver i t i s . 
v i^th the saoe reasoningf Sartre recasts the 
Aristotalian doe trine of Potential and Aatual Beality and 
the dualisa of appearaae and essanoe. He holds that %rhat-
ever i s , i s actual and behind the actual their is neither 
'potential nor virtue*. Being i s alwsys aotuaUsed, what* 
aver i t i s , i t is actual. For exaaple ve should refuse to 
ttndarstaad by genius a particular capacity to produce 
certain work vh i^ could not be actual!sed in the l i fe of 
a person. The g<?fiius of a person, Sartre holds« "is 
neither the work const! erad In isolstion noT the subjective 
ability to produce i t t It Is the work considered as the 
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^taiiil^ of th« 9Kialf«ftatloa of th« i>er«OB**« c^&liiy th« 
etsoiieo is not hlddm in «i»p«ur«n««f 0f««nBe l i 70f««l«d 
in a^pMraae*. 9^a«Q0« Is not • pxopvrtgr *«ttnk in tho 
eanty of an «3dlfft»nt'# *'Th» pheaeaieaftX b«iiig a«iif»»t«« 
Itaelf) i t isanifttstfl i ts ett^nes «• veil at I t i 6xlst««e| 
«nd i t i0 nothins hat the veil eonneeted teriet of its 
4 
awalfcstatlois''. 
Aftor rejeoting this doallatie ehuraet«r of b«liig or 
in other vcrds» afUr lilsovatine being froa the duaXita of 
potentiel «nd eetual or »SBm»e and appeejpanoet Sartre 
pi-occc-da to d«fine h^m* He holdat "B«lng la* Being la In-
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itaelf. Beln;^  la vhat i t la". It lat neither aore nor 
loss than that vhet it la . Beii^ ean neither aeqaire nof 
prodir«» myx doea It have belAf beeaaae i t la Itvelf a being. 
MDyeever, being la aXvaya whatever It iBf i t eanaot be nhat 
It la not. 
ClontSLy tied vlth and equall/ aignifieaat for the 
aMeratandlng of being If ttia Sartreaa aotloo of *Kacistaiiee 
preecfida e«tes«6*. 
^xlatantial phlloaophera •an b«y at iMuity plaeed 
into tvo gi?neral gronps of thelata and atheiarta* While 
t Keijie §aard, Jeepara and ^tereel ean legltloatelar be placed 
in the thdistle groap» Heidesgar, Sartre and aoat of the 
77'Mieh ;^3Eiat»ntlAl phlloaophera tan bo groaned roushljr and 
Iiroftdljr M attidlctf • Jtot only dew tiM phllfli^ii«r« oT 
th«t« tuD gYoopt differ on MHogr peii^t 1w^  vltldLn tb* 
gvoa^ alto t h ^ tev« BW^ ^oliita tf diff «r«oee« Intpit* of 
tb»M ^ttmrmrn— vl»t t h ^ li«f« 1A •oanoa 1« that th«r X^X 
bailete that *B;xlat«(iaa pve«a«d« M»aii»«*« tidM ttaad ttt 
the «9dft«itiii]L philoaoj^ iMta totaXlr rajetad tha Esaa»tlal-
ist le viav i ,a . *aatan«a j^ataadt ailftaiiae** It ifas an 
^aB ravolt afalnat a l l tha tradltioBal philoac^hiaa vhioh 
had wtintaiRad tha pfimmf et gaaaral Idaaa etey individual 
aidatanta* i^aa^itiallato v«ara In search i£ g<ir»i:tl eonaaptii 
unlvargal aatagoriaa OJ? clal'iaitioaa &f ^^i^amcfia^ ??ea.fly all 
tha philoaoj^tiiaa apto 20th oaatuzy were basid jn th^ prlaaajr 
of tha univeyaal ova; th«) lodiMlciudl axixtrnts ^c«pt a f aw 
thii^«r« nho aatlaapatad th« notloe of ptt-mcy of eonarata 
aadatenea ov«r idtaa aaeh as Mutx, 
ExiitaiitiaX phUoaophs^ef on th<d othe? hand^advoeata 
tha pjriaaey of tha iadlviduftlf sab^sctivji coaoreta «xiat«at 
ovar tha gmaraly ehjaativa agsanoa. The saia ajgunt^ at of 
axistantlal philosophata ia that tha iQdivdldU£l axigtaot la 
aor» timxi a gea^fal eoneapt baoaata i t exiate vhilQ a gaaaral 
eoneo^t tiems net • 
Thciatlo asiat^ititlletc aaintaln that •oach Indlvl-
dual mn i s tha i^ealiaa'tlon Q£ a oartain c«ne«ptlae ia tha 
Bivltia iiada»ataiidiiig% and this eoooept vhich is fc;xad ia 
evaryoaa aaa b« deTiaad ac hmutk c&ta»a* Sastr^j >sfing aa 
attwlft, atintaliM that "If Gk>d do«« not axltt tmf is »t 
iMft OB* being vhof« •xlstaneo ooma befora i t ean b* 
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dafiaed by any eonacaption of It". Sartra puta i t *that ba* 
Ing la nan*, vhlla Haldaggar pata It aa tha *ha»a reality* 
It la on tha baala of thla axplanation of tha 
doctrine of *axlatanaa pr«eaada aaaenee* that Sartra holda 
"man firat of all ezlata* anoeuntara hioaalff aargaa up in 
tha vorld-and daflnaa hloaalf aftaTnajnta.** "Hu," ha aaya* 
"la not dafinabla, i t la baaaoaa ha ia nothing. Ha v l l l not 
ba aagrthlng untlll lat^f and than ha v l l l ba vhat ha oakat 
of hinaalf• Mui i t not vhat ha eoneaifaa to bai but he ia 
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vhat ha villa and mkaa of hlaaalf •« 
AXtar thla brief daaerlptioa of tha eooeapt of being 
in Sartre vhlah ia actually t^a fl»ia»apring of hla anbjaetlfi-
ty, %»e aoaa (rather plonge in) to tha oain diaeuaaion of 
"Being and Sothingneaa"! Via* *Being*ln»itaelf * and *Belng-
forii^itaelf*. 
Sartre diatlngulahea t w typaa of being t i s . *Being-
iA»it^X* and 'Being^for<»itaalf *, Thaae are tha two aapeott 
of tha nan*a being* A eoap«ratifa atody of theaa tvo facets 
of oan'a being reteala that vhila being^ln-itaelf ia intari-
abla, onchangeable and aalf ewitainad, being»for«itaelf ia 
aubjeat to ahange, haa tha ability to etolve and poaeasaea 
an onllnlted and eeaaeleaa aoveaMit* 
again and agaia tba% 'b«iiit»iii»itea2f * la and %mat«var oaa 
ba aald about itf la that It alnply axlata. It aan natar 
ba ansrthlni othar than vhat It la* It la tha objaat of 
aoBaalottaneaa or 'iM^hoaaa* aa put b^ ^ Sartra In hla 'Kaoaaa; 
It "la tha ttanaaandant BMtmm* of htuMn azlatanaay haaaa 
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b«3rond tha fraaawork of apaea and tlaa.** It has no *iflthln 
vhleh la oppoaad to a vithont.* **Xt haa nothing aaaratf It 
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la aoUd (aaaalf )**• It haa no nagatloni It la fal l poaltlfl* 
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tjr. It la Itaalf Indaflaltaly and It exhaaata Itself In balngr 
Baiftg aalf*aontalnad and totally Ineapabla of avveaant. It 
la jttst Ilka a ahass^board vhoaa avary apaac la oeeuplad. 
It la Ua full aa an agg'f aa Sartva aayat "In tha ln»ltaalf 
thara la not a pajrtlala of balng vhlah la not vhoU/ vlthin 
Itself vithont dlatanaa* Vihan balng la thus aoneelfod ttaare 
la not tha sllfhteat suaplalon of dsal i^ In It •«•• It la 
fttllnaaa*** lo^ltaalf la not only ladantleal vlth Itsalf bat 
la tha eonplete sad plmtlfitl balngt aa Sartra pata Itt 
"tha in»lt«aXf la fa l l of Itvalf| and no aora 
plantltade aan be lsia£lned| no more parf f?at 
aqoivalanaa of oontant to eontalnar. Tbara la 
not tha slightest «siptinasf la being, not the 
tlneat araak throagh iihloh aothlngnaaa sight 
slip in". 18 
In ecMparlson to balng»iii»ltaalf or oatare vhlah la 
vhat It la* Sartra aaya that belag«^for«»itaalf or aonaalooa-
naaa* la what It la notf and la not vhat It la*. BalngHN»r-
Itaalf la In a aontlnaeoaa proaaaa of negating Itvalf- *a 
Qlhllatlea** It la able to ehangay atolve and qoaation lt«> 
•«lf uid p«rfulii8 i t s t i i t a i * «hleh i t ti«f«r attaltii* For-
•vw trring to f u l f i l i t se l f , i t i s oonstsntlj trying to 
be vbat i t i s oot and caMetiaently nQgatiag vhftt i t aUr^aAf 
i s . Th«rofor« i t Is alvAjra In th« n^te of flij'ht frea i t* 
s«lf. 
When Sertre s&ya that "Bting-for-itsolf• or aan ' i s 
vhat i t i s not and i s not what i t iS | h« siiaply 5»«anf that 
laan i s ^ * * 'soWisr* or a •groc^ Jf* or a •tailor* or a 
'Profosaor* in tho saaa sense as a tablt i s a tabla* *Soll-
diar* or »froear» or •tailor* or »Professor* i s tht "parson 
vho I hafs to b<§ and who I aa not It i s a 'raprasanta* 
tion* f07 cthars and for nQrself, vhieh aean thst I ean ba 
ha only in raprasantation* Bat i t I rapra«ao% n^s9l£ as 
his, I aa not ha) I am s«{>aratad fros hia as th9 objeet 
from Mbjeotf separated bjr nothing» but this nothing isolatat 
m f roc hisu I eannot be het X aan only play at baiag hlsj 
that i t , Ismgina to arsslf that I aa ha« And thartbgr I 
affect hia vith notbingnesa *».. vhat X att«tB^t to realiaa 
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i s a b€ing-in»lts©lf of tha Gaf a vaiter*** 
E«lng.for»ltsalf i s alvayt In tha parsult of Baiaf 
In-itsalf vhiah i t n€^9X attains* Hans a laan i s net ar 
attbjaated to the pilnciple of identity. It i s a hallov, an 
oaptinats, a void v^ich I s never fulfillad» 
k VMPA i t ii«M«« to farther elarify tim mwing of 
b«lii9»f0f»lt««lf vhieh S«rtr« ««y« to bo toawthlng viiloh 
*!• vhat It i t oot | oad i t not vhat i t i i% I t v i l l botoae 
el«or«]p i f %fo too iibot Stvtre iopliot W *^>^ foith*. Tho 
problttt protontod tgr bod foith i t to oxpote the doOIi^ of 
doeaivod and tho dat«>ivor oidttiiig vithin the tatat oontoieot* 
nett ot one ond tho tooe tiiae* For sxaiq>le, hov i t i t petti* 
hXo for « 'hoaotoxuol' to aoknowlddfo hit aott and at tho 
taae t int danjr to bo a *hoaot«Kual* or hov i t i t pottiblo 
for a eoward to aokfiooloddo hit eovardiee and at tha taao 
tioa doelara to^ooimgooat. M l tueh tituationtf Sartro 
tayti eaa be ondarttood br pottitlatiiis a oontoioatnett that 
IM *^thiii i t t e l f t tepariftod from i t t e l f *• What happo&t 
i t that the portoOf in order to peroeive hiatoXf at a eooord, 
neoettarilar offeett 4>ihilatioa, ^ the nihi2Ation or 
negaticm of eovardieet ^ ^ notioa of eoorafe evolvet* So 
vrithia the taae eonteiootnett and at one and tho taat tiao 
both eovardioe and eourageootnost e i i t t* That i t whr Sartvo 
dofinet the eont^t of beiag»for>^ittoXf at toaething vhioh 
*it vhat i t i t not (oomrdly) and i t not vhat i t i t (eoorage-
oat)t or "it vhat i t i t not (hoaDtexual) and i t not vhat i t 
i t (ttoi}*honDtem»l )• Thovofore in order to be one thinfi 
oontoioumett, oan or being or being*for»itteir*y at Sartre 
eaXlt lt» "it neeettarily another and the vhole trtten ia 
X4 
liothingnett". 
Ao elaboratod earlier, Being»in»ittelf i t fu l l 
potitivltyf i t i t at ful l at an egg and hat not a traoe of 
B«g*^^a* B«liig»for»lta«Xft on th« etti«r haady b«liit Bot 
viMt i t i i f i t far ftros balag ai full at an afgf i t i s *a 
hollov nialeh la alvaya futiura* and la tlit **baliic tluvngb 
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-vkileb XothlnKnass eo«ea into ttaa world*** Aod Sot^i^oaaa 
oosaa Into tha World by man* a quaatloniog baeauaa for avar/ 
quaatiOB tbara la tix9 posalbillt^ of a oogatlTa an f^ar« 
**Sha balof by wtilch NothlBgnasa arrivaa in tha world la a 
balng auoh that In Ita baiagf tha Hothlngaasa of i t s beiog 
la ia miaatioB* thm baiag Igr i^iieh Botbingnaaa eomaa to tha 
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vorld Miat ba ita own lothingnaaa**• Sartra holda that i t ia 
net a anihilatinc aot of baiac but puraly an ontologioal 
oha»aotar of baini* 
Sartra uaaa tha oomapt of Hothiognata for hia dia* 
tlDotiott batwaan human oonaoiousnaaa and tha world* Zha main 
funation of oonseloufnasa or Pour-aai ia to obaarta tha 
things or £n»aoi and via giva naaning to cham* Ihia eaa ba 
deaa only through aalaotioa. But aalaetion naaaaaarily 
Inrolvaa datachlng an objaot from othar objaeta ao aa to giro 
thw a maantng* ?or tfcampley i f 1 asy thara ia *Piara* my 
aontelouanaas diatlnguiahaa *Piara* from othar poopla whiah 
aea tltute taa an-soi* In thia proeaaa our oonaoiouanaaa 
anihilataa and nulifiaa raat of the «i»aol or in othar norda 
whila glTing maaning to Piaray axistanoa ia daniad to arary-
thing alaa which then beocmes Nothiscnasa* Ihia whole proeaaa 
ia e ailed by Sartre * Vega titles* • 
Xhia whole proeeas of Xbthingnaaa or Hec^titiaa ia an 
hiaan endeavour* Sartre haa told ua that lothingneaa eomaa 
i ' , 
into ttm world throofh bting* And thia b«lAC| «c v« kaov hia. 
If vtmt h« la not and la not vhat ha lat hanec i t raaaina 
altftra iB tha proaaaa of baeoaiiigl ha navar aolaaldaa with 
hiiaaalff ha ia alwajra foUoiflttg tha aii»aol| ftai of nagation, 
an aBpt^  vaaaal, avar ^aatioalnc and aagatiiig Itaelf t a 
hollow projaatad toMurda fu1»ira« In hriaf i t oaii ba aaid 
that vhlla baittg<»iii«it«alf iaNPll«a paaslvitr» beiiic«fovo 
itaalf iMjpllM aetlvitsr and tha aain fimetion of Dothingaeaa 
Iff to ««Iaat and giva aaaaiag to thlais. 
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SUM « ISllirL 8ABSRE 
Pfjrolio-^Aalytif if « Mtliod of A^li«d lavettigiitlofi 
It InfIa«i«6d alnott a l l th« ^fdLpliA«f of knowl^ df* and 
mrtkB ojt liiiMii aeUvltjr* It v»s a nmttaraX ?«qaire««nt of 
tlio lata 19th aentttyjr IndividaU.*! aliaoatloo at a rasolt 
of aaa«l«ratad tyanaitloa fxoa a Ufa of *a«ai«iJtaeliaft* to 
'OaaalXehaft** **(laaaiiiMhaft« a aodal unit, la a eonaeioaf 
and d«labarata dotign of unltyi lai^ita of oeoaalonal 
aapafataiMasi and Qaaellattiaft aigaiflaa aaparatloa. inaplta 
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of ooaational anity'*, tiotvithatandiiig tho plQrsleal praatBoa 
of parant or paraiit«t tiia inovaa^ng miMber of fattiarlaaa 
07 Motharlaaa ehildran vaa aa Indieation of thd total aliaaa* 
tlon of OMO* All tha rational phllosopMaa firoa CeMartaa 
to Kant iNr« baiag ehallingod Ibgr tliit uniqtt* pliflaoaflooa* 
Ph«iioaaBoZog]r and Eziatantiallsa w«r« gathartng noMiitwi, 
Ttia t«ehal»3flgi«al ratolatloiif vidtb WM in Isht off^ing at 
tha tttra of ttia 99dkVLfff mm net tha only faotor respeaaibla 
for thli ahanga bot tha pvai»iiar aii4 poat»iAr InOlvldtial 
airiataiia«9 vhieh vat at tha eroaa roada of *to ba or not to 
ba* vaa aqoallr raapoaalbla for avolvliig a taehnlqtia to 
proba Into huaaa p9f9h9^ 
SifstniA r^ttdf Madlalnar tturnad Pareholegiat, la 
aoaaiderad to be tha polnaar of pafoho^aiialyala* Hiaaalf, 
ha vrlteat "Pajrcho^analyala is agr areatleof I %faa for %vk 
yaara the onlf panon %tho aonaarnad hlmaalf vlth it,** 
Broadly apaaklng payeho^aaalyala haa two porta via* paycho-
analyaia at an iBvaatlgatlng tool and payeho»aiialyaia a 
therapy. Fraud iiaa baalaally aa Inveatigator but lat^r ha 
vwltahed over to therapy and worked ovar i t ao aa to bring 
a revolution in tha whole field of payohologieal treataant 
of huoan b«liuta« 
ii^xiateatial |Byaho*analyala aan alao be oonaldered 
aa aoneiating of an Inveatigatlng tool aa well aa a therapy. 
Sartre ia of the opinion that axiatential paycho^analyala 
at therapy haa not evolved aa yet* **Thia payeho^aoBlyaia 
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baa not found Ita Freod*** Thia might have been true in 
1943 when *Being and Kothingnasa* waa written but after 
£Lftiea a lot of work haa bean done in axiatential payeho-
aatlysla pArtlealarly by Blfiru«!it*r and H, Bo«t asaally 
kr»«D «• «xlttential ptrehatrittfl* In his e3dLct«nti«l 
ptyeho*aaAlyflla Blnavangar gives « profound "synthesis of 
psjroho^analysiSy phenomonology BBA existential eonoepts 
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sDdifled by original insights* Bosst a stauneh follover 
of Beidegger, in his Daseinsanalytie ra<»evaluation of psycho^ 
analytia therapy and theory sho%rs their "intrinsie hariaony 
and the impaet of Paseinsanalysis on traditional psyeho-
analytic techniques*** Hovev«r, axistsntial paycbo-analyeU 
used as an investigating tool or as a therapy cannot be 
eeneeived vitheut Freud as i t s predesMser, i f not i t s 
founder. Whether Sartre accepts this fact or not i s of 
l i t t l e ioportanoe because inspite of certain points of dis-
agreeaent in aHuqr points th«y agree in toto. A brief eaiposi* 
tien of the points on %ihich they agree or disagree v i U be 
given herCf as a preface to the existential psycho-analysis 
of Sartre. 
The point of departure of all the ps]reho*»analysis, 
traditional or aodem, is aan« Tto traditional psycho-analy-
sis 9 particularly behaviourists» had explained the huaan 
conduct as a mere response to ctiwili. Sartre agrees %dth 
Freod in holding m n to be a unified lAiole rather than an 
arithmtlcal sum, asortre maintains **fhe nrincipl^ of this 
psycho-analysis is that nan is a totality and not a collec-
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tion." Hew if man is a totality then he expresses himself 
9» a nhole even in his «most Insignificant and most super-
f ie ia l b«hAvleiur*. All • • t leni of a « B V r«ve«llng only 
vtwA r«lat«d to ea«*f tetl« oatlook of l l f»• Th^«for«, the 
go«l of «3tltt«ati«l p^roho*am3yft i t oadUiIy *to (l«ciph«r* 
•nd •xpl«lB tho *«aplrieal behaviour i>«tt«rof of ma*^ For 
«iU9l«9 aoat of tho peoplo ignora or do not undarstafKi 
oertaia geituraa or a sign or a vord* Tha *r«valatioas* 
•^«i i f taaoinglr Bon-^taDaiaalt hava ataniag aad ean ba 
daeipharad if tha oan in qnaatioa i f ooRfidared in hia total-
i t y , Bttt '*tha truth**t Sartra holdst ''is aot aQcoantnrad Igj 
ahanaat It btlonga a»prio?i to htiMin conrr^honaioa ftnd tha 
•ftantlal taak is an haroaaeutiQi that ISf a d^eipharlag^ a 
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dataradnatioat and a eonoeptienallcation,** 
Haaaa tha ftartiag point of 0artra*9 exictentlal 
pa7eh&«aiiaXjrfis ia asq^ritnee i , 8 , *prc-ontGlcgieaI eoapra-
henaioa vhieh iiec has of iiha huxBun peracn*. But the bahavi-
ooTt trcQduett sign or gastura or the ravelationa of a paraon 
ara ayiftolisad ia a paaoliar oaaaay hf hia ova ehoiaa, M 
tha aaaa tiaa aaah individual diaguiaaa hia ehole« ondar 
ooeaeiooal character of oholae and i t s hla;»rlcal situaUoa, 
So ooaparlaon ia the cnlf juethod to onderatand thaao ravala* 
tlona which a^ n express in dlffarant waya, 
aartr'9 agr««8 vith Freud on tb« batl* princlpla that 
"all obJ««tively diaoarnibld aan If natations of 'psTchio-
Ufa* iaalntain a ayabolia ralatlon tc th« fuadaiiental total 
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atruatura which coaatitatss tha individual paraon," Both of 
ttiia ftvmw to Mdapt vtiat Aurtr* r«f«rf to M 'prliBArjr 
giveiia**tb« grwit «iplaQAtoi7 idols of our tlam vlx, ti«7«dlty, 
eharaotoiTi •nviroofliiit ete* Exl«tentl«l pt]reho»analftlt 
r»fu««» to r«ooctils« acrthlnc *tetor« th« orlgliial ttpturgo 
of Ixm&A XrMiioa** lb* Fir«iidi«Ji llbdo i t also * vlrigia 
ytM bftt'cra the hlttoxT ol an Indlvldaal Is knovn* For botli 
i t i s as ifieorr<i«t to iM&gine a oan born vith roadyoada 
dlsposltioB as i t i s ifteorraot to eonoaita hia to ba aafii-
polatad aaahanieall/ bf foroas of nature or soeiaty, 
Emplsiistd. psyeho^aaaljrsis {a« fiartra eal ls i t ; as 
v«l l as exlsttfiiUal psyebo-analysit oonsii^ar th« nuoaa 
§LAg m parpatuali aaaraldag hiatorisation*** Wbila analysiag 
auch a baiAg» existaatial pa9rali»<Huial]rsis doaa not uneovar 
%h9 statio aiid eonstent givans ia« haraaitjr aaa onaraatar 
etc* i t uisccvars tha iBaaniag^ orientation and advatitures 
of (laclivi4ual*s} his torr* Both tha iaathocUi analyses do 
not aoasia«r ima to ba si«pljr pras«>t in lim world vittsoat 
any llniiihMit tak» into aoaoont tha total situation in vhieh 
the Qttn i s hlstorioally plaoed, f;aoh 'historioal fact' i s 
considered at onee as a fastor of tha pp psyahia evolution 
and mB a syabol of that efolution. 
Within an existing situation both tha aaalysea saarah 
for a fttada«eint»l attitude vhioh i s beyond tna sitaple and 
log!(MO. a«finl3^ions* I t i s baoause tnis attitude i s basie-
ally prior to a l l logic hanae i t x*^tklt«9 a r aeons true tioa 
aecording to Uw Icvt of flp«cifie qriith«aia* Fyettd c&lla 
this search for tho fondftiBtntal attitude *eoapl«x' and 
Sartre ealla i t 'ori<ioaI otioiea*. 
Both theae p«yeho*analjte8 refute to adoit that 
"the subject i s in a privll^ed position to procead in 
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these inquiries eoneerning himself,** The patient i s not 
to be believed on his oMi account of himsell« Strict 
objective a«thods using aociiiBBntary evidence are required 
by both the analjrsea>Freud believes that the patient l i e s 
oontinaally without baing aware of i t because he i s hind»~ 
•d br detervinant unconseiouf aotivatlons, Sartre rejects 
the unconscious psyche of Prcud since i t escapes the 
intuition of the subject* He oakes the psjrchic^aot co* 
extensive with consciousness* 
Vihatever oaf be the differences between Sartre and 
Freud on the existence or non^czistenee of uo^eontciOQs 
psyche, the nearest equivalent of Freudian unooatcloas 
psyche i s the concept oi *bad»faith* in Sartre* Bad-faith 
i s the inautheHtic eatiatence of aan whose opposlta, Sartre 
callSf 'Project of Sincerity' and that i s anthenticity* 
to 
Just as according^reud, man i s hindered by 'determinent 
uncoaacloua motivation', hence continually Uelng without 
being aware of i t , s iol larly, in Sartre's view i t i s too 
difficult to escape 'bad-faith* and e s tab l i^ authenticity 
or the project of sincerity* In fact , '•authentiglty i s one's 
eapteltr to hmr ttM «rf of hit lancr aott b«liig ifi ttM 
•tlllnMt of hit flolitltud«| i t v«Xli forth froa ttM 4«pt{i« 
of a«n*f oonfoioaatioff jott Ilk* trao love* Tlit aoseati of 
aathmtloi^ ore ovaiilljr lladtod and in sueh jaoaeatt oa« 
Mgr «v«n VMp ••• tout tho taori he ihodi mr« f i t for parify-
iag th« «ag«lf«" So iiiiI«M th« patient reoehes atish a 
lefel of hia eariateoee or oonfeiouaoaaat ha eannot ba baliavad 
to ba ravaalias hia own true aalf« 
Sartre doaa not haaitata to repeat the Uhido 
thaorf of Freud aa ha thiniia that ve aamiot explain all the 
piyehia aanifeatationa in teroe of inatinota. Idhido theory 
redaeea van to hia biology. **The l ib^* or the *vill to 
power* in aatoality oonatittitea a p«yeho*»biB]Dfieal reaidne 
whieh ia not elear in itaalf and vhiah doaa not appear to 
ci aa being beforehand the irrednaiiaa limit of the inveati-
1£ 
gation.** Prendian pay«ho»analyai« givea eontingent reaolta 
vMUMi are not aoavineing aa i t ia axperienae vhiah eatabllBh-
ea that tiie foondBtion of eoaplaitf ia libido. Therefore the 
orifltinal end undifferentiated pro]eat of httnan reality ia 
neither aonatitated nor repreaentad by libido. It ia the 
ahoiee, Sartre propoaea, by whiah a peraon aeta one way 
rather than another9 to relate hiaaelf to Being. The ehoiee 
i t eonaeived ae a fundajBental eharaaterlatia of being \iy 
whdah being aakaa itaUf and esplorea itf ioaenae poaaibili-
tlea . All the poaalbUitiea, grounded in onejfehlng, reaeive 
legitiaaey aa a reeult of ehoiee. Eaah such result viU ba 
at onee fully contingent, legitiaatcay irredu^e and will 
* ^ ^ t rmmln ptftlealan tli« dctallt of bchavioar will 
pajptleal«rii« th« eholB* bat thfljr eannot flHk« It mora 
eooor«t« th«n i t alrwidf it* "That la baeaaaa tha ahoiaa 
la Qothtng otliaf than tha balng of eaeh hamuk realitgr**** 
aa tliara la ae dlffaranaa batwaan axlatlng and ahooaiac 
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for Itaiai.'* 
Froa tbia i t foIXova that lo axlatantlal payaho* 
aaalyaia va hat a not to proaead from tha fnaAaaacital 
*aoa9laai% vhiah ia axaatly tha ehoioa of balng, and la 
axpllaabla only in taraa Ulsa llbdo whiah ia an abatraatlen, 
Tha ecaplwl la tha altlaata ehoiaa, It la tha ehoiea of 
balaf and aakaa Itaelf aaeh« iaeordlnfly Sartra aalntalna 
that tha 111^ aad tha v lU to powar ara nalthar aa ganafal 
eharaaterlatle eooaon to all aaakliid nor aa Irrednoiblaa 
i«hlah dataradLna huoan bahavloor. 
What Sartra vanta to eatabliah froa thla eoaparlaon 
la that axlatantlal pa]reho»an«l7ala la a aatbod vhiah 
bringi to light tha aabjaotlva atwlee bsr vhleh aaoh paraoa 
oakaa hiaaalf what ha la« Slaoa i t ia a eholaa of b«iiig|it 
raduaaa partieular bahavlonr pattarna to fondaaantal rela* 
tloaa of balng expreaaad in tha Indtvidaal'a b^iavloov not 
to llbldixial or aaxual inatlnata of Fretid or *vlll to povar* 
of Adlar, "Tha bahavlor atudlad by thla payeho^analyala v l l l 
Inalada not only dreamat falluraa^ obaaaaiona* and nauroaoa, 
but alao and aapaebOly tha thoughta of vaklng l i fa , av^9»»B» 
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ftilly adjustod a«ti» ftyXef eto**« Bett of tiM «ilit<iiUAl 
psyohoAnalysls of Sartre U largely oo<i««rna4 vith MtAblift^* 
Ing Its relation vith his oRtology* 
/ 
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SlRtRB«S tREOHT 0? 
IMMIZR&TIONS 
8«rtr« vxpooadf his coneept of iJBftglnation in hit 
vovk enti t led *Pi3reholog3r of Imgination'* Ttm sabjeet 
siatt«r of thif estasr ralatef to the preoite nature |>f fiwital 
image, vhioh i s diseatsed in the f i r t t tvo parts of the 
book, \}i^. 
*the Certain* and *the ProMliIe*; derivations frcai the 
observation-^of the aental iaages of others i s prol^ble aad 
that vhich i s given in reflection i s eertain* 
At the vezy outset Sartre sMkes a elear distinetlon 
between the loage vhieh i s the object of our actual oonsel-
ousness and the ioage vhleh ve detoribe. The objeet can be 
described as i t appears to as la the fora of image unless 
the actual consciousness of the object rciaains unaltered* 
This description i s not, hovever« the description of the 
imge as such. For a description of the image a new act of 
eoii»oloucD«aff o«ll«d v«fl««tio&i i t r»qttir«d in titiieh th« 
att«ntlcm It tarMd a v ^ tnm th« objeet and dir«eted to 
th« oannar in vhlQh th« objeet l i given* Itiam a deaeriptioa 
of 9IX ioage as an imaga i s possible only by an aot oX saion4 
degfaa i«e« by rafleetlon and '*it i s this rafleetive aet 
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vdleti peroits the jadgaant * I have an ioage^-' 
*Vbat re^leetion ean teaeb us*f and not, *vhat the 
image i s S i s tha starting point at Sartra*s Psychology of 
laagincitlcn • For this parpcse he uses tha sia^lest aethod, 
vhich in his own vordi Is as followst " v« shall produee 
i!ssg8s, refldet upon thea and describe thea". 
Sartre oatagorizes four main charaoteristics of a 
a<^ntal iimge, 
a) Tha iaage i s a consciousness• 
b) The pheaoasoon of Qaasi*obaervation» 
e) Tha iaaginative coiasoiousnass posits Ita object as 
Nothingness, 
d) Spontaneity, 
Sartre eritieises philosophers of being guilty of 
double error beeause they believe thatf 
!• tha iaage was in oonselousnass and 
2« the object of the ixaage was in aonsolousaess. 
eu 
Tblf odteeneepliMif aoeordlng to Sartre, ftri««fl froa 
oar habit of thlQklo« in tpatte and In tairw of ipaee. Tha 
eleareat «sa»ple of thlt odteeaeeptloB, aptljr l^jsr Sartre aa 
en' 
the lllusloB of ImstttMia, i f found In Rnoa vh«i he distlngul* 
•has batveen Impresflom and Idaaa* Tot Htiaa the idea of 
an ohjeet, for ejtaaple, Tatt, and tha 7es« ai an idea m 
are one and tha laae thing* To have an idea of Tess Is to 
have Tess in conscloosnest. this i s so baeausa Haae believes 
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»vhat i s true of the objaat i s also true of tha idea," If 
tha object has certain qualitias so aust have tha idea, if^ ven 
coauaon sense establishes the saoa vle%f*polnt* Vihen I sajr 
that * X have an ioage of T«as i t i s believed that I now 
have a eertain piature of Tess in agr aonseloasnass. the 
objfwt of JiQT aetoal eoBseloasaass Is Jast this piature vhlle 
the Tess, the girl of flesh and bone^ i s reached but very 
Indirectly and extrinslaaUy* Had the philosophers not taken 
the Illusion of iaaaaenee for granted^ Sartre holds, the 
radieal absurd distlnstloa between eonsoioasness and the 
eoneeption of the ioage would have been avoided* And the 
only vayeut to gtit rid c^ this i l lusion of Iwaanance i s to 
see vhat refleetion teaches lis* 
Kaflection ta i l s us that our perception i s a certain 
consciousness and tha subjeetf for example, t e s s , i s tha 
object of that oonsclousnMs* Now, i f we shut our eyes and 
produce an image of tess ve have just perceived, Tess now 
occuring as an iiaage, can no acre enter into consciousness 
than i t could do so as an object* It i s because the liaage of 
T M I If not moA eamiot b« • tMi* Vh«th«r I p«reelve or 
imgiiio tiM Tett» vbich I s boforo tarn aeafd on th«t ehalr, 
i t &Iv«^ reiaalaf ootfld« of eontciouttiefla. In both th« eases 
i«d« vh«th«r I p«reeifs her or iaagiae t»r^ Tess reaalns 
there in space, on that chair| in that rooia* Hence refleot-
ion telXs as that "lAether I see or loaglne that ehalr, the 
object of Of perception and that of sqr ioage are identical} 
i t i s that chair of straw on vhlch I aa seated, onljr oonsei-
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onsness i s related in two different vajrs to the saias chair a 
Froa above i t is clear that the chair or f^aa i s not 
in eonscloasness, not even as an ioage* It i s also net even 
a snpei^lcial appearance of Tess vhich has soaevhat * extrin-
sic* relation to the existing Tess. It i s , hovever, evident 
that i t i s a certain type of conscioasness, a s3mthetio 
organisation vh^ch has a direct relation to the existing Tess* 
This eertrin typs of censeioosnct^s i s not vhat ve cal l an 
laage because conscioasness i s by virtue of i t s natare, actual 
and concrete vhich exists in and foap*itself * The onlj thing 
that can be said, according to Sartre, i s that the word 
*imge* or *aentel«iaage* indicates the relation of consci-
ousness to the object* The nord aental*i«age i s sooevhat 
coafusing, since i t indicates muf things* The better course, 
Sartre holds, vould be to rej^lace i t by the 'consciousness 
of Tecs' or »tbe loaginative consciousness of Tess». It i s 
this ioaginatlve consciousness i^ioh i s born, develops and 
disappears in accordance with the rules proper to it* 
Q J 
b) XHf IHHWifflHtli 9X QWHl'>gWlfniligi« 
Rov what oor* r«f Itttlon OAB t« l l of about laftilnatlva 
eonsetonsnatt'? the ilopleat proea^hira* aeeordlng to Sartr«, 
i t to axaaina tha laaga la I t t ralatloQshlp to tha eoneapt 
and tha pareept* **To paroalvei eonoalva, Ijaaglnai thaia ara 
tha threa tjrpet of eonsclousaaaaaa by vhlch tha aaoi objaat 
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aan ba glvao to ua**. 
In paFaeptioo un objaet can ba pareeivad f?oia a 
oar tain point of fiav vharaaa It Inelndas an inf Inlta muabar 
of othar points of vlaw from vhleh i t eould be perceived. 
Tha paroaption of an objaat i s tlms a ph^woa^ooe of an 
infinity of aspaets« vhleh Sartra points oPt, ve awst ba 
able to laarnf of vhleh vt flutt ask« a toiur. 
In eonaaption, oallka paraeptioa, va aan think of 
tha oonerata assanoaa in a singla aat of eofMsiousnass* Vfa 
ean aaisa i t in i t s antiraitgr at ena glanea, **This la tha 
reason why ve ean navar paraalva a the'ght or think a 
pareaption, T ^ tvc ohanomana ara ra oally dlatinet) tha 
ona la knowladg vhiob la eonseioas oi i t s a l f , . , tha othar 
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i s a synthatie unitr of ttiltipllioitr of appaasances." 
Paroaptaal knowladga i s hjrpothatlcal b€ iusa Its 
results oay have to ba ohangad on a minute observation. 
Contrary to this an object aa an iaage, i s presented lama* 
diatly for what It i s , »wa have not to laske a tour of It*. 
t^ 
Vli«n i t s kaovlftdfe i t iaflMdl«t«t i^* judgMat la alio final. 
It 18 a •gyiith«tl« Mt* vhlQh Is coBpl«t« at th« v«ry aoaant 
of i t s app««vanoe« An laage l a , th«r«for«| unable to taaeh 
ua any^thlBg boeauaa Ita knovladga la Iraaodlata vhoa« jadg-
•ant la final and aa a afnthatle aet It la oofflplata at tha 
farjr anoent of Ita app«aranea« It glvea aa that knovladge 
vhleh va already know* It la a eloaed elreult* 
Tftillka pareeptloD vhloh haa an Inflnlta niHBbar of 
relatlonahlpa vlth othar thlnga, la«gea bata no r^Iatlonahlp 
vlth tha reat of tha world, •^ha dlffaranca , (batvaan par-
eaptlon and liaaga) la not that of vlvldnasa but rathar that 
tha Ob' eta of tha norId of laagaa ean In no vay ezlat In 
tha vo.Id of p«ro«ptlont thay do not meet tha naeeaaary 
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eondltlona". Moreover, In p-'reeptlon objaeta eonatantly 
ovarflov eonaclouaneaa vhila tha object of tha laaga la naver 
nora than tha c ^aeloaanaaa ona hoa« 
An laaga, tharafora, navar revaala ax^ nav aapeat of 
the object, hanea totally unable to teach aa anything* We 
ean be deceived by pereaptlcm bat not by the image beoauaa 
It la a l l certain and concrete. No doubt our attitude to-
warda tha object la that of obaarvatlon but slnee i t teaohea 
ua nothing. It cannot be eaXlad obaarvatlonf Sartre aaya that 
ve ahoold cal l It 'qtiaal*obaaarvatloa*« 
C) th« lAagin«tlV0 Oonidoiitiiasfl Posits 
III ffhjwti t i TtelMBinftiii 
Sartre hat already show that perception and laacery 
are^ by nature dlfftlnet* l«e« he has deoonatrated the ln« 
adaquaejr of the external eritorla for the Image, It la 
refleetlfe eontoloosnessy Sartre holdtf which can show us 
that this •»lefflc>nt of basle distinction between perception 
and iBiagery Ilf^s In the positional a«t of the loaglnative 
consciousness. 
Every eonselotisnass assoass Its object In Its OMS 
way* Just as perception pos).t8 i t s object as ^irlsitlnf;, laago 
also as8ua«s an ««ct of belief for i t s objects which accord-
ing to Sartre, can have only four foros. These are !• Non-
existent 9. iOisent 3» E:flstlng elsewhere 4* It can neutralise 
i t se l f . First two are pare negatlonsf forth correaponds to 
the neutralisation of the proposition. The third, though 
positive esBuoef an Inpl ld t negation of the actual and 
precwRt existence of the objecti. This \a thr aaln character-
i s t ic of the :' glnai ve conadottstnet; « 1*«. Its object Is 
not present bui Is posited m» sivsh, "Alive, appeal!ni; and 
strong, as an issage i « , t pren*nt9 iter object !S9 not being. 
ThlJ doee not prevent ui from r€«etln?: to the ' la^e If i t s 
ob,1eot were before us . . . . B?5t the f8l4s«|Rnd a/, ^u^uloufl 
condition we r^eh tb*»reby only s^^vee to bring out In greater 
relief , , , . that we se^ ia vain to create in oi:r»elv«^s the 
belief that tha object r ^ l l y ex iats , . , we can pretend for a 
second but ve cannot destroy the liOBediate avareness of i ts 
A) Spoat«i«lty 
Tht lfl»g« aocording to Sartr« ! • •poataa«otif • Being 
'traiif«rfftl* in natttrct I t I s not knovledg*. It la *« diftua-
ed l ight' vhieh conaeloasneas readvaea fot i taelf . Pereaptual 
eonaelouanasa ia aoBMfwbat paaaif« but in loagination y are 
prea<Mntlng things to oaraelvea i*e« aa apontanelty* In 
inaginatlve oonaeiooanaaa va "prodoee and hold on to tha 
objaet aa an Itaaga, Thia la a aort of indaf Inabla eooBtorpart 
of the faet that tha object oaeiura aa a nothiagnaaa. Tha 
eonaclouanaaa appeara to Itaelf a» being ereative, but %d.th-
9 
out positing that what It haa ereated la an objeot". 
Tha auA and aubatanee of theae four eharaeteriatiea 
i s that ioage i s netlther a eow^iU.oo nor a aolid and opaque 
residue, Mr la i t a eroas*aeetloo of the *Streaa of eonsol-
Ottaneaa'o-5t -:; co^iscloiiS'-;:-y? T-'blc!; i ? net ;\''m cr^fiiiot be a 
part of aoae larger eonaelouanaaf, Thia eonaolouaneaa la* 
however, u^ a^blc o reveal assy nev aapeet of the objeet beeauae 
**the objeet aa an image ia never aflQrthlog oore than the 
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eonaciouanesa one haa of it," Plnally, iaage la not only^  
spontaneous but also poalta its objeot aa nothlngnesa be-
oauae its objeet exlata elaewhere which la an Implicit nega-
tion of the aotual and present exlatanoe of ita ob^eeta. 
IX ap far th« dlMoiilOB vat eonfln«d to ocrtaln foraa 
of eonfeloatntfaM «ill«A 1JBM««« There are, bovover, loat 
9ueh objootst for ioraaplef portraits ^ rafleetions In tha 
oimr, IsttatlMff ate* %rhieh although aziatln« in the 
extarnal vorldt are alao eallad iaagea* To ezaolna the at t i -
tude of cmr eoBaeiottfneaa towards such objeet of the external 
vorld Is the subject natter of Sartre*s diseassion that 
followit 
There are, Sartre holds, three stages of reealling 
a thing vhieh i s not present to perception* These are iaage, 
portrait and earieatuve* While ioiage foroation i s soaevhat 
blurred because i t liteka eertain detai ls , port ^ t , though 
lurnlehing the external details ot the thing, laoks express-
ion. It i s , hovever, etu'iaature that presents the vl tal i t7 
and expreesion hieh a photograph lac/a* The 'intention* to 
iaake the absenu thi - present, to bri ;• i t -o perception, i s 
the only factor ooimoon to a l l the three procedures* 
But an absent thing eanaet be brought to pereeptiOR 
directly* There i s , however, a **recour8e to a certain oateriaiv 
used in a l l the three procedures, "vhich act as an analogae, 
as an equivalent of the perception.'* The material used in 
pho^o and the oarlcuture can be studied easily but the 
amterifa ot the aimtal liaa^o i s soaewhat difficult to det«r« 
nine, The material of the a«aital imge, Sartre holds, 
"derives i t s oeaning solely from the intention that aniaates 
i t" . It Will beooae oleer i f we coopare between our 
*iBitiMl iaptr IntMtloii* and th« a«nt«l Umge of tte objMt. 
W« fir at mat to prodaoo tho objaet out of th« told and than 
soBathlBg hftppani vldeb f i n * in cor intmtloR. So in all the 
thraa sltuatlonst vis . Image^  photo and tho earleature, foro 
(vis* intantioQ) raatln tha aana but varsr la aatarlal. 
Tba oantal iflagey lo explained aa not beii^ devoid 
of Intentioni can tiowaver be eharged aa a voluntary and 
produetion of our ofwn ehooalng* Sartre holda that the volun-
tary and involuntary images are tvo ^9tf aiiailar types of 
eonaeiouanesaes. The only difference is that the OM l§ 
produeed by a voluntary spontanletyi the othe by involuntary 
tpintaneity. Intention and idU are not to be eonfuaed vith 
eaoh other* If ve aagr that there «an be an ioage witMtot 
v iU, i t doer in no vay iap2y that there ean be an iisage 
vithottt intention, "In oar opinio)*', Sartre holda, **it ia 
not only the aental iaage vhieh needa an intention in ordw 
to be eonatruetedt an extamal objeet funetioning aa an 
linage oannot •xmrei»9 that funation without an intention 
vhieh interpret a i t aa aoali**. 
One of tba aoat important differeneei between an 
iJiage and a photo, vhieh Sartre eaphaaiset, ia that a photo 
»etwB at firat aa an objeot vhereaa a aental image oeoura 
iiBfflediately aa an iaage betauae **the ecdatenoe of a phyohie 
phenoa€NEion and the aeaning It haa for oonaeioaansas are 
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identical". (It ia aaialy beoauae Sartre denies the 
«xi t t«»e of «n UQeoBMifMifl ptjreh*), Thif otntia iamgt 
vhleh laa*diat«l7 oeoturi ai an loBige appMurf without beinc 
wanted but It naada a eonarata Intantion so as to torn i t 
Into an iaaga* 
Tha parpoae of a l l tha thraa viat liaasa^ photo and 
tha oariaaturs, vhiah aye of eooraa tha 'ao manif speelaa 
of tha aana genus* 9 la aalnly to oaka an object appear vMah 
i s not present* Intention directed on an absent objaat i s 
the f irs t taak vhieh eonsclousness undertakes for this 
purpose* But 'intention' i s not the object itself* "Inten-
tion aerva only as a amnt for fvcking i t s objeatf just as 
table turning i s used to ca l l forth spirits**• 
Froa this analysis i t ean ba eonaludad that "the 
iaaga i s an set which enfisions an absent or aoa»axistant 
object as a bo^t W msana of a )iirsiaal or aeiital eontent 
which is presBBt only as an 'analogical representation* of 
the object* ««itlsioned« Tha specifications are dataralnad 
by the jnateris:!) since the info^Jtiag f'lteation resains the 
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I " . 
This oonelusion nececsates us to ezaisine the Material 
borrov<»d by the iaage* An iaaga can borrow i t s aatarial, 
according to Sartre^ only through two channels, which aret 
1. tha world of things (iMges of Illustrations, photos, 
caricatures, actor's indtations etc . ) 
£• the laental wo rid (consciousness of ssovesuBnte^ f^^elings etc 
A dlfUotttloB b«tif««B th«M two typM of loag^t v l l l 
b« diteostttd in tho poroa that follow* Tho feheao ! • to 
• t a ^ la tura tho foUowlAg oooootoosaostofi 
!• looking at a i^ortrait* 
2« a Mttaofttle drawing* 
3* a faaa in ttia fir«, 
4* hating oantal inaget* 
But bafora going in that dir«atioB it is esflential 
to oantion that th«r« is no olear olaavaga botueon tha world 
of obj«eti and tha vorld of iiaagaf baoauta tha two uorldt, 
real and iaaginarjr are eoi^oted of tha taw stuff| thay 
diffar in *groaping and intarprstation* only* Xt is only 
tha attitoda of ooaseiottsnasSf as pointed oat bjr Sartr«» 
which d«fin«s th« iaaginary and tha real world* M exposition 
of this attituda of eonseionanass will, howstar, enable as 
to detarzBina ana of tha greatest fonotions of eonseioosness, 
the laagination* 
1* sut siMA ttA m. isanjoik* 
Classiaal psrehologists had aithar Mistaken sign for 
an iMLge or aade a eonfasion on the relationship b€twem the 
two* Through a detailed analysis of both iaage and sign and 
their relationship, Sartre tries to reaofe this aonfusioa* 
A photo, m» shown in tha prerioos paras, MBT^^M as 
aatarlal for the iJMga* Sw in tha sphare of sign, there 
Or 
alio ••«•• to be tho $um poilUoiit It can hovever ba 
axplaiaad bgr an eaiaaplaf Z approach aoAa haavy blaok 
•trokas printad abof e tlia door of a taatovy, Tba atrokea 
loaa thair dlaanilona and tpall tha vorda "offlea of tha 
Muuc*'"* ^ ' ^ ^ ^^ * vordai Z nndcaratand and interprate 
thMi* Nov thef® atrokea ara, no longar, of anjr laportanaa 
to M* Z eraatad tha aeanlng flrat through bXaak ttiokaa 
and than froa vorda. But aetualljr vhat Z have dona la that 
•*I have aaffumad a aartaln attltada of eonseloaanesa vhieh 
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enviflona anothar objaet through than**. That object la tha 
office vhara Z hava to go but tha objaat i»a, office is not 
in thaae vordat Z hava knovladge of it* Tha oatarlal i . e . 
aign waa tranaforawdJLnto the office by qr intention tf doing 
ao» fharaforei juat aa in iaaga ao in sign aZaOf va have an 
intention i^hieh envisions an object that ia not praaent. 
Although tha sign "Office", vritten in black strokes, 
does refer to the "Offica", nhich is ptqrsical aa vail aa 
aocial bat i t i s evident that tha relationship of a aign to* 
l^arda tha object, vhich i t aignlfies, i s indiffarent, Tha 
phgrsical Inaga, on the other hand, has a lot of racaablaaca 
with ita object. That i s vhjr Sartre calls thia phgrsical 
iaaga aa quaai-parson, vith quaai^face. Bvan i f ve see a 
portrait froa a purely technical point of view, atUl "tha 
eipresaive value v i l l never vanishf the figure in the paint-
ing begs aa gently to look upon i t aa a B M . " ^ A portzait 
has a tendenay to stand for the paraon i t depie te . The portrait 
o\ 
a«t« v ^ a ui and iBTltts ua to wmk9 pcretptual a|iitli«iltt th« 
nan of floab uA bono* Whw vo at/ ' 2hia i s tha portrait of 
Taaa* or *3his la Xaaa*, thaa tha pletura la no longar an 
objaot tttt oparataa aa natarlal for Imaga* Altboufh tha pareap-
tnal eharaatar of tha portrait of Haaa has not dlaappaarad tet 
I t haa anterad Into tha Imaflnad aynthaals vhara our latantlon 
dlreets I t to tha trua Vassi a UYIHC balngf «ho la not praaant. 
igalttt a vord BVPWM only aa a 'baaeoa 11^t* baaauaa 
I t praaanta Itaalfi avakana a Maanlng) aaanlng foaa to tha 
thing and tha vord la droppad* Tha naanlng doaa narar ratam 
to tha vord* But reyaraa la tha eaaa of phyaleal laaga. Iha 
maanlng oonatantly ratuma to tha Isaga. *Va faaa tha 
portrait and va obaarra I t , ( I t la Ihla obaerratlon vhloh 
baeomaa tha (|uaal-obaarf atlon In tha eaaa of mantal lnag«) 
tha Imaglnaxy oonacloaanaaa of Patar la balng oonatantly 
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anrlehad** • 
MoraoTar In avery luaga thara la a poaltlonal datarad* 
nation whleh a algn laeka. A sign aauaaa ua to anvlslon 
* ion«thing* at tha Tery outaat, but nothing eaa ba afflmad 
about thla * aonathlng* • An Inaga, on tha othar handy alio 
aaualng ua to anvlalon soaathlng at tha vary outaat* oan aay 
a l o t about I t . In Inaga, unllka algn, wa ara not handlaap«d. 
T9»B ean ba a thouaand nllaa fron har portrait but al l har 
pfayaloal q u a l l t i o ara h«ra bafora us. Taaa la poaltad aa 
abaant but har Inprasalona ara hara vlth aa* Sartrai hovarar. 
f««lt that '*lt I t ftn Irrational igrntliaait vliioh la dlff leult 
ao 
to •KpXalii*'* Ha foaa ao far aa to aaj that "tha relatloBahlp 
that oonaolouanasa poalta In tha laaglnatlTa attitada batvaan 
SI 
tha portrait ax»d Ita original la nothing short of nagical,** 
Charlaaa T i l l , although daad, la at ona anl tha aaaa tlaa 
abaant aal prasMit. lia la praa«nt In a atata of * raduead 
Ufa* and abaant aa ' abaoluta* • 
8. Iha Sehiaatla Draidngai 
Iha 41ftlnotlon batvaan an Imaga and a 8lgn« aa 
alaboratad In tha foragolng paraa» oan alao ba shoiA bgr tha 
following cftampla* 
*Lat ua auppoaa that a vail known parson la oftan 
repraaantad In nawq^apara and oarloutars by ttia following 
thraa attrlbutaai a straw hat« q;>actaalast a plpa and gata 
to ba known bgr thaaa thraa attrlbutas* If wa arranga thaaa 
thraa objaats Into whatarar aahsaatlo r^raaantatlons (for 
Instanoa plpat bat| glasaaa) wa hava slgnat f roa thaaa tiiraa 
attrlbutas wa paaa to tha parson vhoa tha/ Intandad to avoka* 
If wa arranga thsn In thalr natural ordar (hat^ undar tha hat, 
glassaa undar tha glassast Plpa In tha dlstanaa) i wa hawa an 
laagai Iha thraa attrlbutas rapraaant tha f soa of tha wall 
known aan«* flow aay oonsidar tha following akateh; 
r.'} 
I t i s ii«lth«r m flgn aov an iB«c«« I t • • « • to « i t t 
aoB«vh«r* b«tw»«ii algn aad an iBag** I t la ttoa dlatinfulab-
lot Taatiura of a akatehy aa Scrtrt holds i to ooettpj goaa 
Intaraadlata poaitlon batvaan an laafa and iba algn. Iha 
skateh In tha fi^* 1 abova naana aottilng in itaalT* Xhaaa 
ara maanlnglass Unas. Wiiat tha^ atand for la that thay 
aall for an intarpretatlon* Ihelr ala Is to prasant a rala-
tionataip* Unlasa va Interprata thesi put ftaaning la tta«i| 
t&igr ara maanlnglass. Jatbougbi thay show no raal raswblaaea 
vlth the objects but tha key to malca them ceanlngfull Is 
tha * aystea of conrentlona* to vhlch they belong and reseable. 
Ifaey are neither Imares nor ^a^ signs beaousa oonrantional 
system does not consider than to be as sooh* 
I t I s however our knowledge whloii Inlirpreta tfisn and 
gives meaning to thee* The idcetoh at fig» 1 has no seaniag 
in Itaelf but our knowledge of the httiaan structure makes i t 
to resemble with the human faea* The problem howawr arises 
that knowledga variaa from man to man despite the faet that 
results are always the aame. Pere^tual knowledge, as la 
vei l known i s prone to i l lusion aa in the asample of Kuller-
Lyert 
fiat apart ffoa tti«t« tad oth«r p«re«ptaal illusioatt 
v« ean rtad mangr thingi la a ikatah. I t dapaada oa tba 
•OTeaant of our 9iy nhioli halpa UB to dateralaa tha f ivaa 
flgura* "Aotually our kaovladf a la aot dlrastly raallsad 
on tbaaa liaasi whloh tgr thMBsalTaa* do aot apaakf It la 
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raalliad tgr aaaaa of ttiaaa aoTaBanta*" Hovavart tba paroap-
taal Bovananta aaa ba nuaaroua on a alngla llna) they ean 
fom many maaxilnga to ona llnat tha aaaa aovanant aaa bring 
out dlffarant kno\d«dgaa« *Wa maat thla vazy unlqua pbano-
maaon In all oaaaai Kaovladga vhleh anaeta a aarabolla panto-
•lae and a panti^liia vhloh la hypoatatlsad, projaotaA lato 
tha ob4aot«* Kaowladga and aovaDant a ra no tt l|iao-faatOt 
tMO raalltlaai **tbara aoclata but oaa tiilagi tba s^ pnbolle 
iloTeBanti «hleh la vhat vaLaatad to ahov, Kaovledga baaoaaa 
awara of Itaalf hara oaly aa aa laagai tha aoaaolouanasa of 
the laaga Is a dabaaad eonaclouaaaaa of knowladga*^  A.,5 
Sartra haa ahova that tha laaga which va aaka fro* 
a akateh la not tha fulflllaaat of naanlng aa vaa hald by 
duaaaral* I t la rathar a dabaaad aaanlag vhlah haa *aaak 
to tha laval of IntultlonV Whlla foaalng thaaa Imagaa tha 
rola of eonacloua aetlvlty la not only Important but It 
Inaraaaaa oonaldarably. Tha Imaga la oonaoloualy tul l t up 
by tha latantlon uhloh ooapanaataa tor Ita ahorteoadnga aa 
a paraaptlon. 
3* Hifiift I A EiJCSt flpo^ Q& Wall! ijau* 
ancpt th« poiltlonal «tU.tud« of ooniolousiMMi th« 
iBAgM, •tolT«d fro* fae«« in tli« f lr« , spots on v»ll« or 
rooks In tho tauBan fonit art not dlfforent froa tno Inag** 
•volvod Iqr sohmatie dravioBs* In tixm easo of sohcaatio 
drawings taera i s a oonstant povar fior provoking oya BOTwants 
but in tba easa of tha spots tba noTaiaants laava no traea* 
lh%B9 arof in sona^ a^ri iaafas in tba air without foundation. 
Xn faet va pratsnd to ••• tba inaga in all thasa situationst 
va borrow i ta natarial fro« tba world of parooptiom **Tba 
iaaga isf tbaraforot a pur a pbantosi a gaaa \iiieh would 
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raalisa i t sa l f by maans of tba appaaranea«** 
Iba aost doniating and unebanging alanant i n alaost 
a l l tba 99999 wbiob bava so far baan analyaad (for «c8Bpla» 
iadtatioui stbanatie drawinga« spots on wallsf signs* 
portariata ato«) bas baan to saka sljraprasantation of an absant 
or non-OKistant objaot* Hatarial was narar a parfast analogua 
of tba ob4a«t raprasantad. Knowladga a ana a l l along tba Inaga 
so as to Intarprata it» to giva a maaning to it* Hanea 
knowladga aoA natarial wara tba eo-relatiTa tarns wbieb 
a^olvad f ron oasa to oaaa* 
Tba natarial of a portrait bas alwaya rtnainad a quaai-
faea. Iba natarial of an iaaga baa remainad an objaat wbieb 
i s strieUy individual. 3Xia individuality, bowavar, i^paars 
vlsf Mtcfial and lcii»iil«4f« iMda ttt to fix n^ owr IHPIMUT 
qoottloii **Vth«t th« BMital latg^ !•?** S«rtr« bos •ItmAy 
deflnod iflftfo • • "aTn oot thftt «iivl8ioiui ma «ii ootiial bo^ 
aa ftbaant or iioii»«rlflt»Bt okjott togr Moaa of « pi^ aiooX or 
flMntal eont«fit| but vhleh ayfoort only throagli ao 'aaalofiaal 
rapraaantatlve of tha anvlaloaad obj^ at*** In tha aasa of 
portraitay aarlaatara or algnai tho ob3«et la praaaot but 
ae far aa tha aaatal laaga la eeoearBaA thara la no ffjt'^mx 
iB tlia axtamal world* To objaatlff tha Maatal linga la to 
arraat It In aurrouadliiga, to loaallsa It In apaoe* Bat 
aaotal laaga aan nclthar olagla ap vlth tha aarrotindinga nor 
aan apaaa ba aaarlbad to It* **fha faat of tha aatter, 8artra 
inaintftlnat "la th&t the aental imge do s^ not .muislon a 
rdal Uhing| vnioh axiata ansng othar tiiinss in tiis vorld of 
pareaptloni bat It snvlslona that thing hy neftne of a aantAI 
laage'*. But t^ to^ e ara oartitln oondltiona for thla aantal 
aontaiitt iMRgn conaoiouana^a approh^da an objaat as a^ i 
*anaIogtta' cf anothor objaot* Platu?«9» aarlaat^xa, ptiotea 
Qto. ar« all objaata for oonaolonsiiaat* Thla rvd^ is slao 
binding tc pufi:f laintal content of tha inentJl Ima^j '^  a 
ooaaolGuaioafa which fooaa the thiitg i t cnvlslona la a pvn^p^ 
toal aoaaelauaneaai a aoitaclotuiiosf u4sieh mvlalonf th« thing 
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&s &Bfftf la a pure 9oiiselo«iaQaaa of aa&iHag,*' Thla ioeoaaal^ 
fox tha mtarlal of tha maat&l lusage ie ealldd bf Sartra tha 
'tranaaandaaaa of tha repraaantatlfa*. Bovavarf tranaaaad* 
aooa doaa not aaan aartarnalltyj i t is tha r«pres€.^ Satad 
O' 
e1ij«tt tkmt i» mttml «nd aot ita Miital «ul«8n«* tlit 
IXlttcioB of inMiMM* voiMlitt of truiifarrlng iatt«9riiiili^> 
•pa6« 9m all %tf •«BslbI* quftUtloi of tho thing to tlM 
tr«s«e«iMl«ot pijretiio ooata^* It aofti not po«««ai tb»«« 
qoAlltlosf i t r«pr«s«Dt« tlioitt bat in i t s own migr*** 
XII. tliif piMioMiiologleai 4«Mfipti0B of tho aoiital iang* 
met iiitari«My l«o4 tu to tho lolutioB of tht f« l^miMnt«l 
qnefftion roftr^ing tho ohmroetoriftioi that eotOd bo ottri* 
hato4 to eonoeioosaoft if i t i t oapoblo of imagining. la 
othaip varda va ooat ba abla to point oat tha pyeei aa aatara 
of aonaaiouaaaaa and ita fanetioa in tha aooatroetion of 
•n iaaga. tha vaal aatura of tiia eonaaienanaaa a«i ba 
ravaalad only vhaa tha phanoMBOlogiaal natriod ia appliad* 
But phonomaologiMl vadnation at onaa oonfsonta na faaa 
to faaa.vith tha tranaaaodaotal aonaeionanaaa vhiahi a« 
alr^adr told br Sartrai >«ntaila itaalf aatv raflaaUta 
daaarlptioii** Thavafora thia aaalraia v iU faild tha foaalta 
pointing ttt tha Hntoition of tha ^99ei— of eonaaiooanaaa*. 
Tha phoaoaMOolAgiaai daaariptioB ahowa that tfanaan-
dant aoBaaionanaaa ii^liaa a aonaaionanaaa vhiah ia aonati* 
tativa of tha world* Thia vorXd ia not how#var oonatitatad 
of tiieh objaata aa tha eav^, tha anlaal or tha mn and thalf 
aoaarata atoriat* Sartra bolda that **va ara hara in tha 
praaanae of a pd-oary and irradnaibla faat vhiah pr«aanta 
itaaif a aontigwt and irrational apaaifiaationa of tha 
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no«Miti« •»»em« of til* voflA"* But an lapll^afeioii «rop« in 
lMir«« liDft p!i«fioMiio2ocl0t« eaU th« *itRoov«riJig of thlc 
ecMitiiiff«fit «3nflt«it ifi i t s «titirelt^* ei astapt^iog. Wh«tli«r 
i t It iMtaplisrfiof or not 8lioiU4 not however eoiwera \i§ ttmv 
b«oaaa« our prl«ary eosoem la to knov vhathar the XmmgXimrf 
ftmotlon la a eootlctgatit and antaptijraleal spaeifleatlofi of 
th« ettmof ooiiaeioaanaaa or aiMHtld i t rathar ba daaerlbad 
aa a eenttltatlva atroetura of that aaaaaea. In other vorda, 
i t oaj be aaked ai to nhethar there la •ay poaalblll^ of 
eooaeivlng a eooaoloaaBaaa i^eh \»tiXd never laagiiie and 
vhiah la never eoapletelj ahaorbed in Ita iataitlona of the 
real. To nalce the probXaa aore underatandable ve aan aagr 
that hfhat anat a aonaelouaneaa ba la orderIhf i t to poaaeaa 
the power to iaagliia?* 
At the veiy ootaet of hit aoalrala of the aental 
ioage, Sartre haa alraadjr warned na againat fallinc W to 
the UlttiloB of laHaneate. Ve beeow vieti» of thla illaa-
loa botaoae ve generaUjr think in apaoa and 1A terna of apaae. 
Here alao ha \mjtn» ua a^inat thla error beoaaae "aa long at 
wo are the viatina of the llXoaioa of Imaiianaa ther« i t 
no general problatt of iaaglnatioai AH the thoerlea whlah 
are the produat of the initidoit of Uamanenae auppljr isagea 
of aoeh tjrpea of eslatente whlah are atria tly like that of 
thingaf th«Qr are reborn aeoaaUontt *they belong to intra-
•ondanee eadatenaeS The iaage, on the other hand* la aa 
rata aa anjr other ejdatenae* The only qneatlon aonaemlng 
ttM i»ac«0f tejrtr* Iiel4t| It titi* probl«i of i t s r«IatloBsiilp 
te oth«r «aList«i04i»y Mud viiftt«T«r tttat r«iatloaa^lp star b« 
tb« «Lltt«iie« of tli« iKAft r«MiBs intMt* It i t Ilk* nylac 
irii«yi«7 tsb« portrait of tfir &yA ic or 1« not a tsao likaaata, 
i^ Mtnar £d.r ^yd i f doad or allYa or ••an viiat^ar h« avar 
<KistaA <ii09B not eooaam us )3^T9» Xha portrait la fiovartlnalaaa 
aoKotlilaf that oKlata* In ttaia aanaa thara doaa aotaaaa to 
ba aojr tfistantlal prehlmt of tha Isaga* 
But aa a nattar of f!aet« wao^amot aidatraek tba 
«RiataBtiaX probliM of tba latagas* Kaapiag in vi«v ttoa 
lAioIa philo.noplT^ of atrtra i t may ba htlA that thara ia a 
eartain tjpa of tftiatanoa attributiabla to tha objaota of 
our eonaoiouciaaa* Iba iqrpothaaia that va hava about Sauifiaao 
tiYa oonaeiouanaaa hi^ paoa to ba radiaally diffarant fron 
tha hypothasia of tha aonaoiousnaaa of tha raal* 2hi« 
i^pliaa that tha typa of tKiatanoa of tita objaot of iaaga 
alao diffara in natura from tha tirpa of a^istanaa of tha 
objaat graapad aa raal. If I f^» an iaaga of Vaati ny 
i&agi&fttl-va ao&ssiouanass iMiudaa a oar tain positloii of 
tha a&istanoa of Saa«t insofar aa aha ia now at this vary 
sBMaiit in Kaateir or Dalhi* But vhila aha appaara to ma aa 
an imagat thia laaa vho i s in Sashmlr appaara to ma abavit* 
It ia thia absansa vtaieh sartra ealla astuality and i t ia 
thia «cistantial nothininaaa of tha Imaginad objaot vhieh ia 
aoottgh to diatinguish imagaa from tha objaats of paraaption. 
It If liAowtf* 9i VbSM el»rMt«fltti« of tiM laftflo 
BAtif* Mt^  B^tf aidBtaiBti %tm.% tli« probleos of 
•jMMofj'* oad *antieipatlon* ore oonsldorod oi two diitliiBt 
fofietloiis vhieh «?• r«dioi6«llj dlfforoat ffo« tho faMUoa 
of iMginatloR* R« lio««f«r brlBfi oat tho dlffwono* ^oi* 
vooii tilt oofitent of roo«Uottloa and thot of tho !>•<•• ^ 
X roeaXl on Ineldont of n^ ^aot Uf •» I do not iMgino i t , 
Z rooAll it* TlMt i t I do not potit i t fti 'givei»"ii>»tiio» 
ob«oflt«', tat «i 'givMwiiow»«o»iii»tho pofts fho kiot of 
f«f« of la«t vfmtng oa looviag • • did not tttm i«to m-
vo«li^» It booaao tbo roolltjr of tho paat* Zt oxiftod in 
tiio pMt whleh is one of ttio aodoo of rool oilotono** Now 
if I voat to oppfefaond i t oDitv, X divoot i|r ooiMoiootooM 
tovordf tbat pott o^joot and tlio oteiit it tooovi^od, Wo 
hot• ttioira obovo tlmt in ordovt to too MtuoXljr tho hiddan 
aioliooqtiot ondor tho otitif, DO hovo to voaovo ttw olioir aad 
•«• tho roftlitar* It i t oxaotlly in tho aaao aoaoof that in 
roealling thia or that va hava to diroot o o oonaoiooanaaa 
to tho paat and raoovar tho otaat* BB^ i f X iaagiJia Taaa aa 
aha aight ba at thia aDaant ia Kaahair (and not aa aha vaa 
yaatardajr on laofini aa), X gra^^ oa ohjaot vhieh ia not at 
all givaa to M or vhioh ia givaa to oa aiapljr aa l^ aiag 
bajroad roaoh, Thoro X graap aothingf that ia, X poait no* 
thiagaoaa. 
Thia argVMnt l a i ^ aa to the oonelaalon that 
iM^Einatifa eonaeioaanaaa ia aoaathiag lika oaraalitjr or as 
f9 M9hAids« tilt 9W—i»9 nttttft of ewaeimma»9§ m 
M to b« able t« fom tiM f#«l okJ««tt moA %h9 iMglntd 
otoJ«9Ut 8«rty« hlghXig^tt tlHi ytlMloBibip b«twt«Ei p«M«^ 
tion mad laif«v]r« TtHir« la « lot of diff«7aao«t Si^tro hoIAa, 
botwooa OB Obj tot to bo omltloiioA mo notbiiig and iMiag glvoa* 
MNoboottt. Muy iflpyof fleiit oro v^otfuood in p«ro«^loB dllv-
•d froa tho oloatntg of tho glv«B objoot whioh dJUroot to* 
murdo othor oopooto or otbot oloarato tf tho MMI objoot* 
Tbooo olwontf do aot Itovovoy rovool tbeaiolvot to IntoitUB, 
For liigt«ni«« th« logo of tbo or»«hoSjr ooiio««l ^rtoia 
etmr«f>» eertein detign of tbo rog oa vbieb It otoado* Bot 
nm ••!«<> thffto hiddcT] •irob*«qnOf «t oxlfftlftg now, oo blddon 
but not at all absent. Vo porteif• the boglnfiingt and tbo 
«n<!iAg« of tba hiddan arab«t«oo8 at toRttmiRg imdor tho 
lege of th« ehalr« It It tharofwttho data idHeb ooablat 
08 to d«t«r«lna or potlt tho objatt that 1« not givaa at 
roal« Tha ob.1oet vhlth Z potlt l .a , tho hldd« ajpabatqoat 
It at raal at tha data Ittalf baoaotajlt glfot oaaning to i t . 
"In thlt taiMTO to pepealvo tbit or that raal datna It to 
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paroeife i t om the fotmdatioii of total raalilgr at a vhola." 
Alt tha inagiiiativa aot i t tha tmvtw* of tho aet of taalltr* 
Zf I voBt to laaglaa tho hilMaa wpabaaqaaty 1 hata to itolata 
tha« iqr diraotijig wf total attaatlott opoa ^oi^ I hate to 
eonttltata thaa tgr oaatiag to gratp thaa la a vaoeoaa aad 
la ordar to gratp thaa by thaateltet, I hava to gr^t thaa 
at abtant. «Th«t tha ioHiglaaUfa aot It at ©noa itoUUag, 
eonttltutlag aad aanihllatiAg** • 
a§T%f nsrtt it ! • f « 7 « M 1 I «Xof«r to ••utoiir (i4iot« ia-
•adftwse U prooXiiwul) tli«B to r«eQU«ttloa« ^ * t la 
eoflBoa b«t«««ii f« f f M ftB ! • • « • moA tti« etntaar M M 1 W ( « 
i f that th«]r Ar« tvo Mp»«tf of Hetliliifiitie, I t la thla 
•aq l^anatloB vtdoh lod tertM to held that the •aaantlal 
roqulalto for a eonMloosaaaa to to aiao to lattglna la that 
**lt mat hafe tha poaalUIlty of poaltlng as phr90th«ala of 
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nnraaXltr"* Bat thla dooa not «aaa that ooaaolottmaaa wat 
taaae halas eoaaelooattaaa of aoaathlng. Tha fwf natura of 
eoBtelocsQaaf) aa la v«n aatabUahadi la that I t la aluagra 
liit«istloBfa« t t v i u 9mm to b* eotiaelonaiiaaa I f I t la aot 
tha ^aadonanaaa of ao«athlBt« sartra holda that I t anat 
hovavajT b« ahla to pealt objaota poaaaaalag a a t t a i n t ra i t 
of Bethlofnaaa in ralatloo to tha i4iola raal l tr* 
Sartra holda that tha laaflfiarr ohjaat aaa ba poaltad 
elthair aa iioiKaxlataot or aa aba«iit or ac aot poaltad aa 
axlatlRf or aa axlatlni i>l»mai»t9. Boy nHataaar tha fora 
an iaailiHiry ehjaat haa aaom thaaa four foraa ahoaXd aot 
Qommrn oa h^r*. fha point to ha aotad la that thagr a U 
locZiida tha aittlra oatagory of nagatloa, thoogh la dlffaraot 
dagraaa. fhua tha aagatlta aot la aot only ooaatltcttlfa of 
tiia lattga but I t 9mm to ba I ta aoat IntlaAta atraatttrai 
nagatloa la navar addad to tha laaga, Thla aagatlta aat la 
howavar to ba haid la reiatloa to tha vhola vorld ao aa to 
aaica an laaga poaalbla. Bat I f va aaaapt tha pagrehologla^I 
aoaaepii that aoaaaleaaaaaa la aaaeaaaloa of dataraiaad 
psr^l9a^ fMtt» %• «ld«ii Say|r« tttisefitf, %hm It 1« 
eiitlr«l3r IspoifiU* tot a «oiiMioatmfa to • ? • ! proAus* 
tf^thiae tet ttM T—X. Tb«y«for« In order to b« at^e to 
fora an SJM«a i t boe3a»a oHligatorr on %tm part of toatai-
eaanofff to aaaapa froa tho vorld. It w i t b« aiaa to vitti-
draw froa tha vorld by Its omi natitra and afforta* *Xii a 
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¥crd i t aiiat b« fr««*« Tbarafera i t i t alaar that aaga* 
tioB i t tlia ofOjr factor vhiah i t an ataaatial aonditioa 
for aoateiotttnatt to ba tuaraal or to produtt an iaafa* Wa 
tboald aot hevafar oad^ttaad tr thab tha iaaga i t pnrelr 
aad tiaplj tha •vorld^aagatad*. Sartra tajrt that "it it 
alwajt fcht %rorld>nagatad froa a atrtaia poiat of viav, 
oaaaly, tha ona that p«ai t t tht potitiac of tha abtanaa 
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or tha aon»axittaaaa of tha obj«at priwaotad at aa ianga*** 
Thit eerUia poiat of view aaa ba aallad a A tnatioa. Htata 
tha ataaatial pra»raqtiitita vhiah taablat conteiotttBttt to 
iatgiaa i t that, i t ba •tittiatad ia tht vorld* i*a, *ba-ia. 
tba«vorld'. It i t thit tl tuttioa»ia»tha»vorld ^iah aoti. 
vatat eoataiotttaatt for tha eoattraatioa of aagr aareal 
Objtat. Aad ia tha leag roa tha aatara of that aareaX objaet 
aaa bt dataraiaad bf thit aotivatioa. 
FroB abov/e i t i t aov al«ar that ia ordar to iaagiaa, 
aontoioBtaatt outt ba fraa froa aU tpaeifU raalitr* 1!hit 
fra«d0B antt howatar ba abla to defiae ittaif br * 'baiag» 
ia*tha vorld* vhieh it at oaaa tha eoaatitutioa aad tha 
aagatioa of tha vorld. That tha aaraal, vhiah i t alvayt a 
twofold aothiagaaaaniothiafaott of i t t t l f ia rftla«ta to 
t« vorldy QotlilB^MM «f tiM world la ftHMtUm to ItatU^ 
•a«t alv«rf b« eoii«titat«d on th« fevndatlon of tif norld 
%rhieh 1% dcnlM'*, 
lov w ar« la « potitien to Qonelad* that iiMgiiuk-
tloa ! • not an M^itloaX potior oT ooaoelotuBooo* 1% It tho 
whole of eonielotitiitit M It rcollsof Its froodoa. "£vorx 
eoaeroto oad rool titaatloB of eooaelotiinoot in ttio world 
if M< with ioagiiiotloii Of aaeh of i t olwoyf j;ir«f ontf i t -
iCnp 
»^lt M t vlthdrowitit fro* tiio raol*** It dfeof not Iwwofor 
fellow thAt al l porooptien of tlio rool soft rotoroo i t fe l f 
la liMLgination* But as eoafolottoaaff if alwajrf In a fito*-
tioa baea>jfe i t i s alwaTf frao^ i t always and at «ooh 
aernn^ has tha poaalbHitar of pro<taioinf tha lairaal* Vhathar 
eonfolousneat reaUsaa or i t iaagtaaf It datorainad at aaoh 
and ovary aoaant by tha varloaa aotlvatlenf or titaatioat 
ia wfoieh tha nen It plaood. *tho aaraal i t prodaead oattlda 
of tha world by a eontoloafaats whioh ttayt la tha world add 
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i t Ifi baoausa h® i t traatoaadaatly f raa that oaa oaa laagiaa? 
That It v^ y Sartra aaintalnt ttwit "it i t a« abaarad tc 
eozMalva of a oonteloatiiatt whiah woald aot iaagiaa at i t 
voold he %o ooncaiye of « oonfoioaaaott vhloh aoald aot 
41 
reallaB tha cogito"* 
-L ^ ' ^ • 
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C O H C L U S I O N 
• * • 
1 r-y 
C O I C L U S I O K 
Xb« problisft ot iJUfinAtioay a s v * baT« diaeasttd in 
tb« foricelag obapt«i« has b««B iftproa^^cd by diff«»ot 
philoaophtff iQ difftriiit vayt. \M Have dlfeuM«d mm9 of 
thvi^ii^ortaat vlwa on tbia Isaaa to amo oxtant. Sovavar 
Bothlm oaa ba olalKod to ba final aithar In r«faf4 to any 
phlloflophara daflQltloa of iBaglnstlon or retarding to any 
particular int«rpartation of a philoaophar* a rlaw* Iha vay 
va iiaTa dltKiuaaad tba probla* iodiaataa only ona of titia 
•arloat vaya of looking ftt thli probl«B* In tiia praaant 
oJaaptaTy va propoaa to drav aona oonoluslona froa tlia aarliar 
diteuaolon aad alao try to oritioally attinata variotta 
tandanoiaa in thia ragard. 
1 pp 
^ibll* AMXlag vltki tht T«rl«4 ««fiai Uoas of t ^ 
eoatipt • r iaaglafttioav* h&Y« aoUatd that tii« pfOlil«i l i 
bfttiomlly piy«telogio«l i& natar* • • Higiily d«Iloat« end 
•MisltlT* en** fgyolaoliogj as a ttaifl«igaA dlaoi^^lina la 
a vary lata daYaXepmaat In tba flalA of Imovladf •• Oraika 
• igbt hava daalt vith othar payoteloglaal problwa tet« 
vlttliigly or UBvlttlnglr tiMT narar daalt vith thla proklaa 
l a tba form aa va kaov I t todar* iKaglaatlon aa a pliUeao-
phlaal or pigrotaologloal pretola* bi^pana to ba aa l i ^ r t a a t 
aa aaor othar mt^tajralaal problw but I t fallad to attraat 
thalr att«itloB« Ora^ approach or oatlook wai mainly aata-
phjralaal* I t la this otttlook which lad then to aaa nothing 
bat tha cog&ltlva valaa of tha aa&tal procasa and tfeerafora 
Ui^ totally Igaorad tha latrlaalo tharaetarlstieB of aaah 
aa i&portaat aad vital prooast* 
Wa h&Ta aaaa la tha foragolag chapters that for Plato 
l&agla&Uoa rfl&aload a aoaavhat lower eantal aotlvlty* Xha 
reason la that I t was corduelva to hla * Ihecry of Idaaa* • 
Arlste>tla'8 posltloa la act aach dlffaraat froa Plato. Ha 
aay hava catsgorically r ajactad Plato* s phllo so phi aal poal-
tion (aad la fact ha did) and a8t«bllii:i«A his owa poaltloa 
but hla outlook towarda tha whola thoughtoprooaasf partloular-
ly towards laaglaatloa* did aot aaka axqr brsak through* 
SanalUYa aouly ha holds, haa two aspaotst tha appatltlfa aid 
tha aogaltlTo* Maaery la aa out^growth of appatltlTa soul 
wharaaa Jaaglaatloa Is aa off*shoot of eogaltlra aoal. Although 
ha dlff ara froai Plato oa aaaa datalla, ha look a at tha px«bl«i 
of iBHlAt loa froa tha oogalUva pelat of wlaw. Ihla pealtloa 
ICf: 
Itads at to prmmuf that altteugli th« Qr««k ptriod i» m«rlc«i 
vith 9U7«l7 B«tap)iQr3ld&l t«nd«&ay« th«ir approaah to Iwif loft-
tloB m s i«th«r •plstoBologieal and not tb« a«taplqrait«l on* 
vhleh l«d thsa to • • • tbo aognitlvo Taluo of tho aoDtal 
proooss only ftjod igaoro tho iBtrlniio «harMtorlttlet of looh 
a irital proQtta* 
Platnolo-WLatotalian tradition dominated al l ttio 
flalde of knovladgo upto the I8th Qwntwt^^ A»D« Host of tba 
phlloaopliarsf vbo vara interested la psycholcgf also> dealt 
wltia iMAjsilmtlon a s a part of eplstesfsclogr mi f&lXed to 
raallea i t s Kotaphysiaal or i!KJLst«ntlal r.etura. Deaeartea 
eottld nwLba<»r frea himself from the aehollstic Influent e oor 
oould approaeh ieaginatlOB from omplrleaJ. vleir point. Ue 
maintains that Isafimtion i s concerned vltn all th i^t \Aioh 
i s pietorabla (vhieh aaa be pereelTed) and whieh 1^ ; unplotor-
able fa l l s iB the domata of tinAerstanding* He tisns plnees 
imagination at a aomevhat lovisr level* I t i s hcverer an 
entirely different queatlon whaler the rationalists on the 
whole vented to osanieipate philosophy from Chrlstain dogicaties 
or thior were aetually interested in rationalizing Christainlty. 
So far as the problsm of ioafination i s eoneerned the ratienal* 
i s t approa^ eould only emphasise the anperiorlty of Intelleot-
ualisatleB and ttiat was natural for theea. They, particularly 
Peaoartea^ were Tery eloae to the Greek tradition aa thay 
ahared their rationalism. If Greeks had intentionally rsgarded 
imaglA tion aa a somewhat lower mental aetlTity, the ratioaal-
i s t s did i t unintentionally. 
i:o 
dofBatlot antl-Bystlo t«id«aol«S9 had b««a earriaft l^ artbar 
tha sJaapa of piinoseplkjr l a tHa IBth and Idtii eaatuiy wuld 
jiaTa baan totalXjr dlfftfraot. Hao-Platoolw aad •jratioln, 
whlali vara not totally aHainatady vara juat to «Kavfa again 
l a tba garb of ratlonallaa. A ravoXt agalaat thaaa tfladao-
slaa liaaad In tha f o n of iMplrlalsa vhleh oulaloatad la 
Hua«' a philosophy* ama* s approach tolBnglnatloa vaa wtlraly 
diffaraat* fia aada elaar dlatlsatloa batvaaa iapraaaloaa aad 
idaaa* *A11 tha pareaptlona of tha tetaaa alnd raaolra th«i-
•alTaa Into two dlatlaat klnda{ vhloh X gbaix ealX la^aialoaa 
and Idaaa* • Ha calXa tha falat laagaa of ttia liQ>raaaleBa of 
tha astamaX objaata aa Idaaat vhleh ara la-faat Imagaa* Ha 
dlTldaa thm furthar Into alapXa and ao^ pX«K oat«(orlat* Iha 
funetlon of laaglnatloa la acaiblalng tha slapXa or oovpXtf 
Idaaa la aot paaalYa bat aatlYe. Haasa laaglcatloa^ la Hoaa'a 
vlaw| baaoaaa not only a firaa aantaX aatlvlty but aXao a 
araatlva faaultgr of Bind* da hoiravar varaa ua ooaftialag 
Imaglnatloa ^th umotr aa fraadoa, btlag tha baala eharaatar-
latio of laaglatloa^ dlatlagulahaa I t £ro« a^Mry* Hat la a 
my I antiolpataa Saiftra la aalntilnlac that wltboat fraadoa 
aalthar tha laaglnatlon nor tha oraatlvlty la poaalbla* Thla 
vlair of Unaa la Important baaaaaa It faralshad tixa baala 
aodaX whlah waa lat«r adoptad by Sartra, l a ^ l t a of hla aaEqr 
objaotloaa to fiuaa* a yi.w. Sartra's arlt l t laa of Eaaa la 
raXarant to thla dlaeuaaloa. Wa aaad not tD go Into ^ a datalXt, 
but tha aalB point that daaanraa no tie a la that Sartra rajaota 
tha baala tSiasla of a«ii».dlvldlng para^ta Into laprasaloa aad 
i d e a s , xie c a l l s i t the ' i l l u s i o n of Immanence', of vhicn v;e 
become pray becaase we a r e accustomed to think in terms of 
space . Tnis c r i t i c i s m c u t s a t tiie very r o o t s of Humiean .-oncept 
of lma«inatloa. ikof has b««ii eh«rg«d th«t th« Imagl&atloB 
vhi«h b« refers to la his Sfrestlse i s a speoifla fora of 
belief. He elsrlf led his postUoa la'Saquiry* ttat laaciB*-
tloa eaa eerUlaly ass is t la the produetloa of belief bat I t 
eaaaot loy I tse l f beooae belief* Srea l a asslstlag for 
establlahlag a belief, thefjreedoa of the imaglm tlTe process 
i s restricted by our eustoas aad habits} vhea i t i s free i t 
beeoaes a total oreatlTe aetlTltgr. 
The two dlTerc«nt treads vls« BatioaaliaB and Biplrle-
IsB got eoaverf ed la tiie approprlstlo philosophy of Kaat, t^r 
Kaat soaethiag besides the sease lapressioas (Baprlelaa) and 
the ideas we have about then (aatloaallnB) i s always at vork 
la all our experieaees. fie ca l l s this soaetiiiflg which i s la 
fact 'Power for the syathesls of the aaaifold<, as laaginatioa* 
Uallke Descartes aad Plato, laagiartioa la Kaat Is aot a lower 
meatal aotivity. He elevates iaafloatiea or the image aakiag 
faculty so high that la his view the «i.perleace of the world 
i s not possible without lt« He howe3»' does aot equate iaage 
with aa iaea. Aa idea i s , as i t were, the opposite of aa 
iiuige{ i t i s what the highest power of the alad caa produce 
but what caa never la aay d r cue stances be «K«BpllfieA la the 
world, nor brought before the seases to be actually observed. 
idea caaiiot be other thaa a goal or Ideal, never to be 
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toa9l«t«Iy r«aliMA« ! • UMS this !»»(• Mkliis fMolty in 
tuD s«Qi«« Yls* «tpirl««l Md triaM«a4«at«X iBMlnatloiu 
jttqpirldml l««gii*tloa I t • purtlj 1B«C« Bakiaf pro««ss ubieh 
varl«s rroft man to m»a* XraaMtndintaX iBacinfttloii on tb« 
otii«r iiftodi i s us«d for understanding of tbo world wbioh 
nappeos to bo snbjoot to ehax^o. Ho also uaaa tlio toma of 
r^roduotiTo and produetiTt inaginatlon for «ipirieal and 
tranasaodontal imagination* Vfberoaa roproduotivo inagination 
vorka to tbo wpirieal Xavty produotiva inagiMition ia paralr 
oonatraetLva and eraatlva* 
Kant* a pbiloaoptay has %iork«d lika a brldf • batiratn 
tha eontradiotoxy positions of rationalists aod tha oiq^rioists* 
His basic thasis on tba sattlsBont of this oontradietion ia 
that in his opinion sKpariansa of this world i s possibla only 
^ a n both tha sansoiy asjuall as in tall actual part of our 
knovladga of tha world ara ssialganatad* Ha aaorlbaa aqual 
valfht aoi atatua to both tha souroas of our knovladga. I t 
i s i aa f ia t ion whioh wozka in our ainda in such a way so aa 
to agmthaaiaa taasa two souroas of our thought* 
Kant* a d i s t iwt ion batva^ai so^irieal and tranaoandantal 
iBBfimtion InmadiatalT la«da ua to thadistlnotlon batwaaa 
priaarj and aaoondary iaagiimjion nada by Colaridga* Priaary 
iaiagiajtion« in Colaridgat i s soaawhat IdanUoal with Kant*s 
sMpirieal iaagintion in so far aa tha funetion of tha foxmar 
i s to paroaiTa tha world and in tha easa of tha lattar to 
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•akc th« iJMgM on t^t baalf of tbo porooptual kaovloato. 
SoeoQ<3*ry i»«cliMitloii toe i»« aoae idontitgr with tim trutf-
eoadontal Inafimtloa boocato tho bMio aatorlAl on vhleh 
both of thoB work roudjus alaott tbo «ttio tbougb their 
fiirthor dovolopnoDt at voll as thdr onA-prodtteta b«pp«is to 
bo radically diff«» nt. But aoeoadary laaciBation i s abaoluto-
If diffoiant from Jiwo*! ooaeopt of iaaginatloiu In ordor 
to oroato now idoasi inagiimtion in dmrn^ nnifios sinplo or 
eosploK idoaa wuaroaa aooondary inagtnation in Coloridgo 
dif Aiioaf disaipatoa and diaoolToa lo aa to 4raato now idoatf 
i t unifioa only whon thia proooaa ia raodorod lapoasibla. Aa 
in HiM«t ^*^^ *^ Sartrat Cdaridia alao raj acta to oenaidar 
imafimtion aa nanory or a rabaaraal of nantal inagaa* Ha 
aaans to agraa with Huna only whan ha holds paraaption not 
only aa an asaential grcavA for inagimtion but alao a gataway 
to it* I t ia howavar Wordsworth who goaa atraightly againat 
iiiaia*a or Colaridga*a Tiaw on tha rela of paraaption in Inagl-
nation* In Vfordsworth, inaginaUon aan woxk arain whan thara 
la no paraaption without aqua ting i t with nanery* Unlika 
Colaridga aod Hunoi Wordsworth holds that absansa of pareaption 
ahould maka no obataala for tha art is ts iaagimtiott* a i » a 
nothing oonaa from abova^ fron void« an artist aan work with-
out pareaption by his own inagiAtiva powar* In * 3ha Paddlar' 
Wordsworth shows hew b9 had prm»TW9d hi a ehildhood inprasslens 
whieh ha narrataa at the groi«i«i9 age* audi a type of laagina-
tion« wa hold, oan ba no aora than a alaar or din nanory* 
Wordsworth alao 9*m» to have fallen pray to Sartre* s *Sllasion 
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a lammmmm* bMtua* h i t itat«&«Bts at ir«ll «• b i t •pyroasli 
to iaaglmtieii i t aothiag tout tht r t to l t of thlnklQi in tptot 
tad in t«XKt of ^at«» 
Lodwlaf .vlttcantcela't riBtzlct about tbtst pMlotophtrs 
art alffillar to thott of 3trtrt* Ht mqrM tiiat thtrt i t t kind 
of gtntral dittate of ttaialcing whieh alvayt lookt for (and flodt) 
what would be ealltd a mtntal t U t t fioa vMoh a l l our aett 
aprlng at fron a rtttrrior* Bting eonmittad to tht purtly 
liBfulatie analyslt vithout aiqr oxitttntitLl inportf WlttctatttlB 
dota not -tie tho (|utttiont l ik t *vliat an ImRgt it* or tort 
ispertaatljr *vhat iiappent whan ona laagiiiat tMitthliic* bat ht 
di t tutt t t in dttai l hOM vt use and inttrprtt tht liord iaaginatioa* 
He bringa out tiit naturt of i»agiaing by txplaining tht ralation 
batvaan v ^ t va aay about tht isagt !••• bow va utt tad Inteiprat 
i t and vnat va tay about tbt objtct of ^ttiitk i t i t an inaga* Af l«ir 
a datailtd •xplination of tblt ralatlontbip ha eonoludtt that 
Imagination ia our Ktana of intarprttiag tha world at wall at of 
forming inagaa in tha aind* Xha inagaa thcBtalTtt art not 
saperata ftxm our intarpratatioat of tha world} thajr art our way 
of thinking of tha objaett in tha world* 
In oontratt to alaoat a l l hit pradaeaatortf Sartra 
aatumat that our abilitjr to imagine i t tquaraly idantioal with 
our ability to detach ourtalvet frnt tht actual tituation* idian 
we anvition a aituation which i t totally unreal, we are able to 
imagine, to form the imaget* In order to maintain thit position 
1 1 ^^  
and ^artleolarly to r«jMt th« fluBtftn aodoly hm laoldt 12i«t 
ptro^tlon ika« notbiiK 0eaaoa vltti iB«flaatioB| oa tli« eoatrarj 
•acb •zslud«8 Vck.% oitii«r fXelusivftly* For Ms to p«rceiv« doos 
not aoas to mssoiblo images by aoans of sontatioas* Ualiko 
poreaptlont vhloh has an Infinite' nmbor of ralatioaa^lp vith 
othar tblagS) iaages bava no ralatlonablp with Cha rast of tba 
vorld. Ilia dlffaraaoa batveeo laaga and parceptlon i s not that 
of vividaasa but rathor that tba objaots of tiia vorld of laagas 
oaa ia ao way axlst in tba world of paroaptlonf tb«y do not aaat 
tba aacaaaary eonditioaa* Horaovar la perception objects 
aoaatantly overflov ooaselouanass vhlla tba object of tba iaaga 
ia aaTar aora tban tiia consoiottflnasa oaa h&a« Because of Ita 
abaoglnf ebaraotaristies va can be daecived by paroaptioa bat 
aot by tba laagas vboaa objaat renalas alvays fixed* 
Since every eonaciousaeas asaumes i t s object, in i t s 
ova wayi Iaaga a saaiaa ita objaat iii a a&a&ar voiob ia naituar 
abaeatf not no»»axist«it but siaply existing al^sovbere* nds 
asaoaptioat though poaitivOf ia an iaq^llelt aagation of the 
actual and preaant axiataaea of tlia objaat* 7hia ia the aaia 
aharaatarlatio of laagiaativa eoaaoiousnass, i .a* i t s object ia 
oot preaant but i s to posit objaot as sach« Iiaaget according to 
Sartre ia aliTe» applftling and strong which presents i t s object 
aa aot baiag« Wa ean pretend for a aeoond that the object rally 
oKists but va can aerer destroy the iaaediata avarioaas of i ta 
aothiagneaa* lasge aocordiag to aartroi ia aeithar a ooaAitioa 
BDV ft floXlA ftnd opft^ft r«clduftt nof I t I t ft oroftft-ttetleB of 
tbft * fttreftB of eoaftoloa•&•••* Init ft ooaaetottuaMft vhlth i f 
not ftndl oftnoet be part of amo l u g o r eon«eioaftBocs« I t posltt 
Itft objMt ftt Bothing&osft biftftuto Itf objoot «sista tlftonhftro* 
I t i t ftft ftot «bloh wnriaioiift fta ftbs«nt or noii*fKiftt«nt ^ j « c t 
ftft ft bodyi by »«ftnfl of phytloftl or aontftl ooatftiit wbloh 1* 
pr«ft«Dt only fts fta 'aoftlogloftl rftprftsoDtfttlea* of tjtio obJ««t 
aoTltionod* Zho fftot of tlio Bfttt«r» Sftrtro holds, i t ttiftt 
thft aontftl Ijuftc* doos aot onfltioa ft roftl thing, vfalch ttigta 
•aong otter tbiags in thoworld of porooptloa) bat It onTlBloBft 
thftt ttalag by aoaaa of ft aoatftl isftgo* Aftir ft dotail«d 
•Bftlytift (ftlr««dy dlscusaod la ttio Ifttt oh«pt«r) Sartro 
ooneludoft that negation la tb« only faeter iitiieh Is ftn •ssontlftl 
condition for eonaciousnasa to bo uaroal or to produea Isagta. 
laaga la bovvrar aot ba taliaa fta partly and slnply i^rld-nagattdf 
I t la ftlvftya the world negatod froa a tartftla polat of vlov, 
aasaly, tbt otrtala sltu^tloa* H«&tt tht taaantl&l p r ^ 
rtqulatt wblob anablas oonaoioutntaa to Inftglat I t tiiat It ba 
altuattd la tha %iorld I . e . ba-la^tbo-world* I t la this eltua-
tloB->l»*tho»wDrld, which iBotlvatta tontelouaaata for tha 
ooaatruetloa of an tiaraal«obj«6t l«t* to laftglnt* 
Sftrtrt hfts eategorioally daaltd that laaglaatloa waa 
o3.ta«r what ha waa talklr^ about, or what ha waa enq^loyiag, 
wa woold howawar Ilka to oloaa «ala dlaaartatloa vlth a pasaaga 
rroB Balng and lothlngnes^ whloh la nothing bat a wtry powarful 
axpraaalon of iaaginatloai 
•*3ha honey whioh alldta off ay spoon onto tht honty 
la tha jar f lrat teulputta tht aarfatt by faatta-
lag i t s e l f onto I t la r t l l t f , and i t s fUaloa with 
tiM vbolt i f prMtat«4 ms « grtdaal tiaklagf a 
oolla^a* lAiloii «pp«ars at oast ai dvflatlea aai 
as dl^plart li^« tlia nattaolaK out of tfao full 
broaata of a wosaii i ^ la lylag on har baok«*»* 
tiia alovnaaa>of ttka diai^poaraoaa of tha d m 
in tha bosoa of tha v ^ l a la fraapad fir at In 
aof taaaa vhloU la Ilka a ratardad annlMlatlon 
and aa««a to 1»a playlni for tlnof Imt thla 
aoftnaaa laata up to tha «>d{ tha dfop la auakad 
Into tha body of tha Tlasoua aabatanea •••• If 
an objaet vhloh I hold In iqr haoda la aolld I 
aan lat It go vhan I likai Ita Inartla ayahollaaa 
ay total powar •••• Yat hora la tha Tlaaoua 
ravaralng tha toma* If tha oonaoloua halnf an 
auddffily oonproBlaad* I opan agr hand* Z want td 
lat go of tha Tlaaoua ohjaat anl It Olaka onto 
na* It drava na« I t aueka at ma* Ita noda of 
being la nalthar tha raasaorlng Inwtla of tha 
aoUd npr a dynanlan Ilka that In ifatar* ahlah 
la iBLhauatadlLa floalng fron ma* I t la a aof t 
ylaldlng aatlouy a nolat and r>*lnitta aaeklng* 
It Uvaa obaouraly undar my flngara*** At thla 
aoMifit I auddAly undaratand tiia anara of tha 
vlaaouat It la a fluidity ahlah hold a and 
ooiq}X«Blaaa na •••• Tha Tlaaoua aoana to land 
Itaalf to na« i t InTltaa na| for a body of 
Tiaeoalty at raat la not aotlaaably dlffarant 
froa a body of Tory danaa liquid* But It la a 
tru)* Tha Tlaooua la Ilka a llqald saan la a 
nlgntnara '^vt% all Ita propartlaa ara aniaatad 
by a aort of Ufa and turn baek against na« 
Vlaaoalty la tha raraaga of Baiag ln»ltaalf» A 
alakly*avaat fanlnlaa ravanga ahloh vUl ba 
aynbollaad at aaothar laral by tha (quality 
*attgaay'*.»« A aufary Tlasoalty la tha Idaal 
of Tlaooua I It iQfiboll aaa tha sofaxy daath of 
oonaelouanaaay Ilka tha daath of a aaip whiah 
alflka Into tha Ja* and diovna** 1 
avtra, Jaan-Paul, *B«lng aad lothlngaaaa*, trana. 
Uaaal E* Barnaa, Waahlagton s«aara Praaa (H«X. 1986), 
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